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Abstract:  This research examines how fire service supervisors, from the rank of 
lieutenant through fire chief, perceive the existence and impact of bureaucratic politics.  
For testing of the research hypothesis, bureaucratic politics is operationalized through the 
theoretic lenses of organizational and institutional politics.   
 
Regression analysis indicates there are statistically significant negative linear 
relationships between perceptions of organizational politics (POP) and strategic planning, 
budgeting and building social capital.      
 
Augmenting these findings, regression analysis suggests there are negative linear 
relationships between internal influencer groups (chief officers, rank and file personnel, 
and other internal stakeholders) and respondents’ perceptions of institutional politics 
(PIP).  That is, as respondents’ perceived each group’s influence increasing, there was a 
corresponding decrease in POP scores. 
 
Conversely, there was a statistically significant positive relationship between PIP and 
local elected officials.  There was also a statistically marginal positive relationship 
between POP and business groups.  That is, as respondents’ perceived these groups 
influence increasing, there was a corresponding increase in PIP scores. 
  
Regression analysis also suggests that as the level of education increases or the higher the 
rank, there are corresponding decreases in respondents’ POP scores.  Likewise, as the 
population served increases there is a corresponding increase in respondents’ PIP scores.    
 
The results of the statistical analysis, while not as definitive or supportive of some of the 
hypotheses advanced, did bring to light some interesting findings. 
 
First, there is clearly support for the notion that employees at all levels perceive the 
existence of internal and external politics. 
 
Second, respondents perceived that certain groups affect specific management activities.  
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a positive affect reducing POP, while the later increases PIP.     
 
Finally, there is evidence to suggest demographic characteristics, both individually and 
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
An eternal quote from Plato contends, "One of the penalties for refusing to participate in 
politics is that you end up being governed by your inferiors” (Petersen and Fusarelli, 
2005, p. xii). While this may seem too Machiavellian for some, for many others it's a fact 
of their professional lives. That is, politics are real or, at the very least, they are a 
perceived reality.  Lasswell (1950) succinctly defined politics as “who gets what, when 
and how.”  His definition, however, obscures the complex nature of the phenomenon – 
particularly with respect to public sector organizations.  Unfortunately, the ubiquitous 
nature of politics makes developing strategies to deal with them difficult.  This is 
particularly problematic for bureaucratic managers who must contend with these daily 
pressures to effectively carry out the missions of their respective organizations (Daft, 
1986; Vigoda -Gadot and Drory, 2006). 
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Politics and Bureaucracies 
Much of the literature pertaining to public sector politics centers on the interactions 
between various actors that use their respective preferences, goals, and discretion to shape 
policy outcomes.  In this respect, models outlined in the literature help describe how various 
actors exist within or external to a given political ecology and how their systematic interplay 
affects bureaucratic organizations.    
For instance, Lowi (1969; 1979) described these relationships as “Iron Triangles” 
where bureaucrats, legislators, and interest groups interact to influence federal policies, 
outcomes, and outputs (Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1: Adapted from Lowi's (1969) concept of the “Iron Triangle” 
Lowi (1969; 1979) advanced the notion of “interest group liberalism,” which he 
defined by its unique attributes:  
 It is optimistic about government;  
 expects government to be a positive force necessitating expansion;  
 believes the best intentions for society motivates government action;  
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 and, holds an enduring belief that what is good for government is good for 
society. 
To achieve these ends, this form of government activism relies on four forms of 
coercive power: regulatory, redistributive, distributive, and constituent (Lowi, 1969; 1979).  
As such, Lowi (1969; 1979) contended these relationships are codified through a process of 
bargaining and negotiation during the legislative and administrative rule-making process.  
Lowi (1969, 1979) was critical of these relationships as he believed they had evolved into 
incestuous associations that promote the interests of well-connected groups at the expense of 
the broader public interests.  Inherent in his model is the notion that bureaucrats are key 
actors who directly influence policy outcomes within the sphere of their respective areas of 
responsibility.   
Lowi’s (1969; 1979) theory led to a broader interest in how politically motivated 
actions influence policy formulation and implementation, albeit, primarily at the federal 
level.  His theoretic framework, however, is equally illustrative of the political policy process 
at all levels of government including those involving local bureaucracies (Clingermayer and 
Feiock, 1990; Weber, 1947).  Fire departments are a type of bureaucracy that has received 
little scholarly attention with respect how politics influence policy development and 
application.  The next section details how fire departments meet the standard definition of a 
bureaucracy.  This, in turn, establishes the purpose for analyzing fire agencies as 
organizations that are as susceptible to political influences as other local governmental 
entities. 
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Fire Departments as Bureaucracies 
Although scholars have long argued the specific features that constitute a bureaucracy 
and, more specifically, what types of entities fit into this category, this research project treats 
fire departments as bureaucratic organizations.  Three salient pieces of literature provide us 
with a useful description of the bureaucratic model, which can then be used to justifiably 
describe fire departments as bureaucracies: Weber (1947), Downs (1965), and Wilson 
(1989).1   
In Weber’s (1947)  The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, the German 
sociologist identified what he called the “ideal-type” of public organization, which became 
synonymous with bureaucracies.  He hypothesized that most fully developed bureaucratic 
organizations exhibit six distinct characteristics:  
1. There are fixed jurisdictional areas each with clear spheres of competence and 
each governed by strict rules and regulations. 
2. Organizations are hierarchically structured. 
3. Management of an organization is based upon written documentation. 
4. Office management requires specific expertise that necessitates hiring “qualified” 
personnel to fill these roles.  
5. When the organization is operational, bureaucrats devote their entire time to their 
assigned administrative activities. 
6. Organizations are governed by a set of stable and exhaustive rules. 
                                                          
1 Much of the literature referencing or focused on fire departments, such as Ahlbrandt’s (1973) study of fire 
service delivery in Scottsdale, Arizona, accept the notion these organizations are inherently bureaucratic.  To 
the knowledge of this author, there has been little attempt to empirically validate the use of the bureaucratic 
label to describe fire agencies.  This is beyond the scope of this project; however, this section uses previous 
bureaucratic literature as a predicate for characterizing fire departments as bureaucratic organizations.  
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A second distinct aspect of bureaucratic organizations is the position of the official, 
which he asserted is itself a vocation requiring specialized training and competencies. 
Additionally, the official’s position is regarded with esteem, is a lifetime appointed position 
achieved through career advancement, and for which the official receives financial 
compensation to fulfill the position. 
Given the aforementioned descriptions, it is hard to dispute that most US fire 
departments (irrespective of type, size, and governance structure) exhibit all or most of 
Weber’s bureaucratic characteristics.  For example, virtually all fire departments require 
members to maintain some level of skill as evidenced by the defined roles of “firefighter,” 
“engineer” (also referenced as chauffer or driver-operator), “company officer” (usually 
denoted by the rank of Lieutenant or Captain), and “chief officer” (typically defined as 
battalion, bureau, district, division, assistant, deputy or chief of the department) (Bachtler and 
Brennan, 1995; Barr and Eversole, 2003).  As such, each rank has prescribed roles, 
responsibilities, and corresponding skills.  Moreover, rank, by definition, is hierarchal and 
determines the level of authority and responsibility for each position, which are broadly 
recognized within the field itself (Bachtler and Brennan, 1995; Barr and Eversole, 2003).  In 
other words, firefighters from one agency generally understand and respect the rank of 
Battalion Chief despite there being no real authority over those outside his or her agency 
(Bachtler and Brennan, 1995; Barr and Eversole, 2003; International Association of Fire 
Chiefs [IAFC] and National Fire Protection Association [NFPA], 2009).      
Although fire departments come in all sizes and types (volunteer/career/combination 
or city/county/special district), most rely on specially trained staff to carry out administrative 
functions such as finance, human resources, and dispatching.  This allows operational 
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personnel to focus on core functions such as firefighting, emergency medical services, 
technical rescue operations, etc.  Finally, fire departments codify rigid rules into written 
documentation such as Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), Field Operating Guidelines 
(FOGs), or policies, which guide, govern, and provide organizational stability (Bachtler and 
Brennan, 1995; Barr, and Eversole, 2003; IAFC and NFPA, 2009). 
The second scholar to lend credence to the idea that fire departments are 
bureaucracies is Downs (1965) who conceptualized a bureaucrat as  
…any person who works for a large organization; receives a money income from that 
organization which [sic] constitutes a major part of his total income; is hired, 
promoted or retained primarily on the basis of his role performance; and produces 
outputs which [sic] cannot be evaluated on a market. (p. 440)   
It is the last point that sets Downs’ conceptualization of a bureaucracy apart from 
Weber (1947).  That is, fire departments provide a service that is largely ignored by the free 
market system, thus it is more precisely defined in the economic literature as a public good 
(Baumol and Blinder, 1999; Heilbroner and Thurow, 1998; Rhoads, 1985). 
Baumol and Blinder (1999) succinctly describe a public good as:  
A commodity or service whose benefits are not depleted by an additional user and 
from which it is generally difficult or impossible to exclude people, even if people are 
unwilling to pay for the benefits. These are socially valuable commodities whose 
provision cannot be financed by private enterprise, or at least not at socially desirable 
prices. Thus, government must pay for public goods if they are to be provided at all. 
It may be difficult, costly or impossible to collect fees for the public goods provided. 
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In addition if the opportunity cost of serving an extra user is zero, then the good 
should be provided at no charge. (p. 256)  
Many economists assert that establishing a market value for a pure public good is a 
near impossible task.  Even if a price could be established, people might be discouraged from 
participating despite its broad benefit to society (Baumol and Blinder, 2000; Heilbroner and 
Thurow, 1998; Rhoads, 1985). Perhaps of greatest concern for policy-makers, without 
government intervention certain public goods would not be provided at all. It is for these 
reasons that services such as national defense, police, and fire protection are services 
provided almost exclusively by government (Baumol and Blinder, 1999; Heilbroner and 
Thurow, 1998; Rhoads, 1999).  As such, these organizations exist in a political environment.     
The final scholar that helps conceive of fire departments as bureaucracies is Wilson 
(1989).  Wilson (1989) expanded on Weber’s (1947) and Downs’s (1965) work in his 
seminal book, Bureaucracy, where he categorized bureaucratic organizations based on the 
visibility of their processes and outcomes.   
These processes, in turn, define bureaucratic firms in four categories: 
 Production – have measurable processes and visible/understandable outcomes 
(e.g., Social Security Administration). 
 Procedural – have measurable processes, but they have no visible or easily 
measurable outcomes (e.g., District Attorneys). 
 Craft – have no measurable processes but have visible outcomes (e.g., the 
military). 
 Coping – have neither measurable/controllable processes nor visible outcomes 
(e.g., fire departments). 
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Given these definitions, Wilson’s (1989) taxonomy firmly places fire departments in 
the last category, Coping, as they frequently have immeasurable processes that yield no 
visible outcomes.  That is to say, it is difficult to establish common processes by which all 
fire departments mitigate fires.  Each of these incidents requires an assessment of numerous 
variables, which affect the specific strategies and tactics taken (Phillips, 2004).  Adding to 
this complexity is the fact that outcomes for a given incident are not universal.  For instance, 
a “successful” response for one incident may entail containing the fire to the room of origin.  
Conversely, a similar fire, with a different set of conditions, may be considered successful if 
the fire spread is contained to the building of origin.  This necessitates assessing the success 
of any incident on a case-by-case basis (Bachtler and Brennan, 1995).  This makes the 
process susceptible to subjective opinions for the purpose and importance of specific 
activities, which can drive politically motivated behavior.  For instance, recent trends in the 
fire services have shifted toward focusing more resources on risk reduction activities.  This 
emphasis, however, can come at a cost as it may expand educators to as opposed to adding 
additional response personnel or apparatus (Cline, 2011).     
Despite the scarcity of bureaucratic literature focused on fire departments, the 
aforementioned scholarship clearly indicates these organizations fit the conventional notion 
of a bureaucratic organization.  Moreover, as organizations with bureaucratic structures, fire 
departments are presumably as vulnerable to political pressures as any other bureaucratic 
organization.   
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Fire agencies, therefore, are a noteworthy bureaucratic type to study.  Accordingly, 
the following sub-sections establish the foundational elements for this research study by:  
1. Outlining the purpose of the study. 
2. Advancing both the research questions and hypotheses that were empirically 
tested. 
Purpose of the Study: Fire Departments and Politics 
Understanding the political pressures external to and within a fire department is as 
important for the profession as it is for other industries (Grant and Hoover, 1994).  Little 
research, however, focuses on politics affecting fire service organizations.  The most in-depth 
study to date was conducted by Charles Phillips (2004), a former fire chief for Miami-Dade 
Fire Rescue, for his dissertation titled “An assessment of the factors that affect the level of 
‘perceptions of office politics’.”   
Phillips (2004) examined the degree and impact executive-level fire service 
administrators (fire chiefs) perceive “Organizational Politics” to exist. 2  He also examined 
how organizational politics helps establish a specific type of culture and climate within fire 
organizations.   
Phillips (2004) used statistical regression to analyze survey data derived from 155 
responses of large U.S. metropolitan fire department chiefs (those with at least 400 
professional/career firefighters).  He found that a significant percentage of respondents 
(36.9%) perceived organizational politics to be a real phenomenon.  Although Phillips (2004) 
is careful to note that his findings are not generalizable to other groups, they were consistent 
                                                          
2 Phillips (2004) uses the term “office politics,” which is interchangeably used with organizational politics in 
some of the literature and there is no discernable effort made to differentiate the two terms.  What is evident in 
the literature, is that scholars use organizational politics more often than practitioners who prefer the use of 
office politics to describe the same phenomenon. 
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with previous research that had established that management perceives the existence of 
organizational politics (at a rate of 40%) less often than subordinates (at a rate of 70%)  
(Osborn, as cited in Phillips, 2004).  That is not to say, however, that fire chiefs do not 
perceive politics to be real.  Rather, the political pressures this group experiences may 
originate from outside the organization, which is one of the fundamental questions for this 
project. 
A second finding of Phillips (2004) is that organizational politics are more pervasive 
in larger departments.  He posits that the most likely cause for this correlation is that larger 
departments are more diverse, rigid, and impersonal.  These features lead to more 
interpersonal conflict than in smaller departments.  Again, given the limited distribution of 
Phillips’s (2004) survey instrument, it is difficult to determine whether this finding is 
applicable to departments with fewer than 400 employees.  Nor is it obvious that his findings 
are generalizable to departments that comprise either career and volunteer firefighters or an 
all-volunteer force.  This project, by contrast, expanded the sample size to include a more 
diverse population than Phillips (2004) used, which is discussed in more depth in Chapter III. 
This will enable the researcher to better understand the impact institutional and 
organizational politics have on fire departments of all sizes, operating within different 
governance structures (city, county, special district) and for various ranks (lieutenant through 
fire chief).  
Finally, Phillips (2004) found that while most participants acknowledged the 
influence of an active labor union, their involvement did not prove to be a factor in most 
participants' perception of organizational politics.  This runs contrary to what practitioners 
normally believe to be true.  If chiefs are to succeed, they must routinely contend with the 
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industry’s oldest, most prominent, and powerful trade union – the International Association 
of Fire Fighters (IAFF) (Bachtler and Brennan, 1995; Barr and Eversole, 2003; IAFC and 
NFPA, 2009).  In fact, the union’s executive leadership openly and vigorously engages in 
national-level politics and advocates that its affiliates, likewise, actively participate in local 
and state politics.  This synergistic effect makes the IAFF a formidable political group at all 
levels of government.  As such, many local unions have enough political power to favorably 
influence local governance decisions such as salary, benefits, work conditions, and the 
selection of fire chiefs (Bachtler and Brennan, 1995; Barr, and Eversole, 2003; IAFC and 
NFPA, 2009).  Therefore, the relationship a fire chief develops with a union is vital for 
determining his or her success up to and including continued employment.  In spite of this, 
however, Phillips’s (2004) research indicates fire chiefs do not generally perceive unions to 
be a source of internal political pressure.  This is relevant for this project as fire chiefs may, 
instead, perceive unions to be an institutional or external pressure.  The Perceptions of 
Organizational Politics Scale (POPS) survey instrument used by Phillips (2004), therefore, 
may not have accurately gauged the existence of this source of political pressure.  This 
necessitates the use of an instrument that can capture the external dimension of politics fire 
chiefs perceive to be relevant for their success.     
With this in mind, the following project examines the extent to which fire service 
supervisors perceive the existence of internal and external politics.  Moreover, if they exist, 
do supervisors perceive them affecting management activities?  The primary benefit of this 
study is that it expands upon Phillips’s (2004) findings, which may provide deeper insight 
into the relationship between internal and external politics and fire service managers.  In turn, 
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this awareness can assist fire service leaders develop the requisite skills needed to 
successfully manage these counterproductive forces.  
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
The foundational question presented for this research project centers on understating 
how both dimensions of bureaucratic politics (organizational and institutional) impact fire 
service supervisors.3  Specifically, the project’s focus is on how supervisors at all levels of a 
fire department perceive institutional and organizational politics to exist and what their 
impact is on four management activities.  Bureaucratic politics, in there simplest context, are 
those activities engaged in by individuals or groups intended to protect or promote their 
special interests (Allison, 1969).  While not inclusive of all scholarly definitions, it is 
sufficient for a basic understanding of the concept; however, the next section provides a more 
in depth analysis of the bureaucratic politics literature.  
Based on the literature, this quantitative, non-experimental research project explores 
four research questions: 
1. To what extent do fire service personnel perceive the existence of both 
dimensions of bureaucratic politics (institutional and organizational)? 
2. When respondents perceive one or both dimensions of bureaucratic politics, how 
do the phenomena affect their ability to execute core management functions? 
3. At what supervisory level or classification within fire organizations do 
supervisors perceive one or both dimensions of bureaucratic politics?  
                                                          
3 The use of terms “leaders” or “managers” have different connotations in organizational literature.  For this 
project, however, the distinction between the two terms is not necessary.  As such, the terms are 
interchangeably used throughout the paper and have no effect on the research question or methodology.  
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4. What additional individual and fire department demographic characteristics affect 
the perceived existence of one or both forms of bureaucratic politics 
(organizational and institutional)?  
Additionally, this project advances three research hypotheses that center on 
demographic (individual and organizational) factors that may help predict the existence of 
institutional and organizational politics.  Hypotheses #1 and #2 correlate respondents’ 
demographic information with their perceptions of organizational politics (POP).  Hypothesis 
#3 correlates a respondent’s rank or managerial level within their respective department with 
their perceptions of institutional politics (PIP).  A second set of hypotheses (H4 and H5) 
correlate the perceived impact of institutional and organizational politics on four 
management activities. The five hypotheses tested are stated more specifically as:4   
Bureaucratic Politics and Demographic Characteristics 
 H1: The lower the rank, the more respondents will perceive organizational politics 
(POP). (pp. 42-44)  
POP (Dependent Variable [DV]) ~ Rank (Independent Variable [IV]) 
 H2: Fire agencies with more personnel (both operational and staff), the more 
respondents will perceive organizational politics (POP).  (p. 45) 
POP (DV) ~ Number of Personnel (IV) 
 H3: The higher the rank, the more respondents will perceive institutional politics 
(PIP).  (pp. 30-31 and 37-38) 
PIP (DV) ~ Rank (IV) 
 
                                                          
4 The parenthesized page numbers at the end of each hypothesis references the location within this paper that 
provide the theoretic framework or previous research that support testing the selected hypotheses. 
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Bureaucratic Politics and Management Functions 
 H4: The higher the perception of organizational politics (POP), the more 
respondents will perceive the phenomenon affecting one or more management 
functions. (p. 40-45) 
MGT Tasks (DV) ~ Perceived Organizational Politics (POP) (IV) 
 H5: The higher the perception of institutional politics (PIP), the more respondents 
will perceive the phenomenon affecting one or more management functions.  
(pp. 30-33 and 37-45) 
MGT Tasks (DV) ~ Perceived Institutional Politics (PIP) (IV) 
The aforementioned discussion should give the reader a basic understanding of the 
foundational elements that comprise this research project.  Chapter II delves deeper into the 
concept of bureaucratic politics and its two distinct dimensions through an examination of 
the relevant literature.  
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Definitions and Terms 
 Advanced Life Support (ALS):  A higher level of medical care provided by 
emergency response personnel such as licensed paramedics, nurses, physician 
assistants, or doctors.  These life-saving measures and skill sets are determined by 
individual states but often include: advanced patient assessment, cardiac care (such as 
defibrillation and airway management), administering medications, fracture 
management, surgery, wound management, and obstetrics. 
 Aerial Ladder: A specialized fire apparatus used to gain access to structures using an 
elevated ladder where conventional ladders might not reach. The name is derived 
from the fact that the large ladder is mounted on a turntable on the back or middle of 
a truck, allowing it to pivot around a stable base, which in turn allows a much greater 
ladder length to be achieved. In order to increase its length, the ladder is telescopic. 
 Apparatus: A term usually used by firefighters describing a department vehicle (e.g., 
fire engine, ladder truck, medic unit) 
 Basic Life Support (BLS): Is a level of medical care given primarily outside of the 
hospital setting and is designed to treat immediate life-threatening illnesses or injuries 
until more advanced life saving measures are applied.  These activities are provided 
by trained medical personnel, including emergency medical technicians, paramedics, 
and other persons who have received BLS training.  
 Battalion: A group of four to five stations that are collectively supervised by a 
battalion chief. 
 Battalion Chief:  A mid-level fire department manager at the rank of chief officer 
who is in charge of several assigned stations. 
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 Captain: The rank above lieutenant and below chief. 
 Career Firefighter: In the U.S., is a person whose primary occupation is as a 
firefighter thus deriving the majority of his/her earned income working in the fire 
service.  
 Company: two or more firefighters organized as a team, led by a fire officer, and 
equipped to perform certain operational functions.  
 Company Officer: A fire officer, typically a lieutenant or captain, who leads a team 
of two or more firefighters in a company.  
 Emergency Medical Services (EMS): Those medical procedures and actions taken 
outside of a hospital setting to address immediate or potentially life-threatening 
injuries or illnesses through proscribed medical care and/or transporting of patients to 
hospitals or treatment centers. 
 Engine (also referred to as Pumper): A fire suppression apparatus that has a water 
pump and carries fire hose and a limited supply of water.  
 Engineer (also referred to as Chauffer or Pump Operator): A firefighter 
responsible for driving the engine to the scene of the call and operation of the 
pumps on an engine, to provide sufficient water to the firefighters on the hose. 
The term may be either a position title or a rank; usage varies among departments.  
 Engine Company: A group of fire personnel that includes one to two firefighters, an 
engineer and an officer that staff a specialized apparatus with a water pump and that 
is equipped with fire hose and other tools used to extinguish fires.  
 Fire Chief: Typically, the highest rank within a fire agency. 
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 Firefighter: People who respond to fire alarms and other emergencies such as 
EMS, fire suppression, rescue, and other similar incidents.  
 Fireground: The operational area at the scene of a fire incident where an incident 
commander is in control. Also used as name of radio frequency to be used by units 
operating within and area of operations.  
 HazMat: Hazardous materials that includes solids, liquids, or gases that, if released 
or triggered, may cause injury, death, or damage.  
 Incident Commander: The officer in charge of all activities at an incident.  
 Ladder Company: A group of fire personnel that includes one to two firefighters, an 
engineer and an officer that staff a specialized fire apparatus with an attached large 
articulating ladder.  The primary responsibilities of a Ladder Company are to supply 
ladders, conduct search and rescue operations, force entry and ventilate the hazardous 
gases from a structure. 
 Lieutenant: The rank above firefighter and below captain responsible for managing a 
crew on an engine or ladder apparatus. 
 Officer: A firefighter who has the rank of lieutenant, captain, or chief and is 
responsible for those personnel assigned to his/her command. 
 Paramedic: A level of Emergency Medical Technician (EMT) whose scope of 
practice, while varying from state to state, typically involves, but is not limited to, 
advanced patient assessment, cardiac care (such as defilation and airway 
management), administering medications, fracture management, and obstetrics. 
 Professional Firefighter:  Most states require certification of skills to be classified as 
a “professional” firefighter.  This entails meeting standards such as training, skills 
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competency tests and performance of activities in specific hazardous environments 
(such as advancing hose in structure fires and extricating patients from automobile 
involved in an accident). There are two accepted categories of Professional 
Firefighters--Volunteer Firefighters who may or may not receive pay for services and 
Career Firefighters whose primary employment and source of earned income is in the 
fire service.  
 Rank: A classification or level of firefighter, which normally starts with firefighter 
and progresses through lieutenant, captain, battalion chief up to fire chief. 
 Standard Operating Procedure/Guideline (SOP or SOG): Rules for the operation 
of a fire department, such as how to respond to various types of emergencies, training 
requirements, use of protective equipment, radio procedures; often include local 
interpretations of regulations and standards. Generally, "procedures" are specific 
while "guidelines" are less detailed.  
 Structure Fire (or Structural Fire): A fire in a residential or commercial building. 
Urban fire departments are primarily geared toward structural firefighting. The term 
is often used to distinguish them from wildland or other outside fires, and may also 
refer to the type of training and equipment such as "structure PPE" (personal 
protective equipment). 
 Sworn Personnel: Uniformed fire service personnel who have taken a sworn oath to 
protect and serve the community in which they work.  
 Truck Company (also referred to as Ladder Company): A group of firefighters 
assigned to an apparatus that carries ladders, forcible entry tools, possibly extrication 
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tools and salvage covers, and who are otherwise equipped to perform rescue, 
ventilation, overhaul and other specific functions at fires. 
 Volunteer Fire Department: An organization of part-time firefighters who may or 
may not be paid for on-call time or firefighting duty time, but who in nearly all states 
are held to the same professional standards and take the same examinations to 
advance in rank as career firefighters. 
 Wildfire or Wildland Fire: A fire in a forest, grasslands, prairies, or other natural 
areas that may also threaten structures. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 
Before testing the hypotheses, it is first necessary to define and understand the term, 
bureaucratic politics, which encompasses both internal (organizational) and external 
(institutional) dimensions.  These dimensions, once understood, allow for the identification and 
operationalization of the dependent and independent variables.     
Defining Bureaucratic Politics 
While it is widely presumed that public policy making in the United States uses 
democratic principles, a closer examination reveals a more complicated process.  As noted in the 
previous section, it consists of negotiations and interactions amongst multiple institutions, 
agencies, groups, and individuals all vying for power, control, or influence (Johnson and Libecap, 
1994; North, 1990; Rubin, 2000; Wilson, 1989; Vigoda-Gadot, 2003; Vigoda-Gadot and Drory, 
2006).  Since bureaucratic agencies implement policies in a political environment, it, therefore, 
entails internal and external groups exerting influence over policy outcomes (Johnson and 
Libecap, 1994; North, 1990; O'Leary, 2006; Wilson, 1989; Vigoda-Gadot, 2003; Vigoda-Gadot 
and Drory, 2006).  The concept of bureaucratic politics has been the source of numerous studies 
since the 1950s, albeit primarily from a foreign policy perspective (Bendor and Moe, 1985).  The
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succeeding section details the most relevant studies for this project. 
Graham Allison’s study of the Kennedy administration’s decision-making process during 
the Cuban Missile Crisis elevated the theory of bureaucratic politics as a mainstream academic 
concept (Brower and Abolafia, 1997).  Allison theorized that if a nation chooses a given action, it 
was the result of bargaining amongst individuals and groups within government.  One of 
Allison’s explanatory models (#3) theorizes that a combination of channels, positions, players, 
preferences, and “pulling and hauling” ultimately yields policy decisions (Allison, 1969).  When 
added to his idea of the “rules of the game” these elements constitute the core activities that 
constitute bureaucratic politics (Brower and Abolafia, 1997).  While Allison’s research focused 
on foreign policy, his theory is flexible enough that it is applicable to other levels of government.  
Once Allison formulated the concept, it did not take long for scholars to recognize the 
complex nature of the interactions and relationships that exist between various internal and 
external actors (Bendor and Moe, 1985; Brower and Abolafia, 1997; Johnson, 2005).   
These scholars subsequently simplified the concept of bureaucratic politics as theories 
that help explain how bureaucratic bodies make public policy decisions (Johnson, 2005).  
Inherent in bureaucratic political theory is the recognition that various groups protect or promote 
their own interests. These, in turn, often conflict with other competing interests (Johnson, 2005).  
These pressures can reside inside or outside the bureaucratic body and all, to one extent or 
another, help shape policy in a manner that protects or expands their respective spheres of power 
and influence (Johnson, 2005). 
Halperin, Clapp, and Kanter (2006, pp. 104 - 111) expanded on the role organizational 
structures have on foreign affairs policy-making, which can, similarly, be applied to other policy-
making entities.   
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Halperin, Clapp, and Kanter formulated six "rules of the game" that influence how 
organizational structures influence policymaking:  
1. "Who has the action?" 
2. "Who must sign off?" 
3. “How high up must an issue go?" 
4. "Through what channels does an issue move up to the President?" 
5. "Can informal channels be used?" 
6. "In what form does an issue come to the President?” 
As Hammond (1986) notes, the limitation of Allison’s (1969) and Halperin, Clapp, and 
Kanter’s (2006) models is that neither analyzes how alternative channels (e.g., various politically 
motivated groups) influence the policy-making process.  Other scholars, however, did study these 
potentially harmful relationships from various vantage points including “Iron Triangles” (Cater, 
1964; Freeman, 1958; Truman as cited in Bendor and Moe, 1985), “regulatory capture” 
(Bernstein and Stigler as cited in Bendor and Moe, 1985) and “interest group liberalism” (Lowi, 
1969; 1979).  These perpetual interactions involve institutional structures, organizational cultures, 
interest groups, politicians, and bureaucratic actors (Bendor and Moe, 1985).  
However, despite the expanding range of theoretic perspectives, the early analysis of 
bureaucratic politics was still narrowly focused.  As Bendor and Moe (1985) note, no 
comprehensive model emerged that allowed for an analysis of the multi-level interactions most 
scholars acknowledged existed but failed to incorporate into their respective theoretic frameworks 
(Bendor and Moe, 1985).   
That is not to say that these early models did not contribute to a better understanding of 
the phenomenon.  For example, Freeman (1958) and Truman (as cited in Bendor and Moe, 1985) 
examined the policy-making relationships between congressional committees, the executive 
branch, and interest groups.  Similarly, Peltzman (as cited in Bendor and Moe, 1985) posited that 
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regulators often make policy decisions that significantly affect the transfer of resources between 
interest groups (e.g., business and consumers).  Peltzman went on to define regulators as 
“bureaucrat-politicians” who utilize their unique access to privileged information to take 
administrative action that helps curry favor with politicians, interest groups, or the electorate.   
A second significant contributor to the bureaucratic politics theory was Niskanen (1971) 
who hypothesized that budgeting is an inherently political process.  He argued bureaucrats seek to 
expand their budgets to increase their power, authority, or security using their access to 
proprietary information unavailable to outside stakeholders.  Since budget managers have in-
depth knowledge about the true cost of their operations and are keenly aware of the demand for 
their agencies’ services they control the budget process (Bendor and Moe, 1985).  By using these 
intrinsic advantages, managers are able to affect funding allocations, which, according to 
Niskanen (1971), invariably leads to larger budgets.   
Peltzman and Niskanen’s primary contribution to the bureaucratic politics paradigm 
entails the concept of “winners and losers” (Bendor and Moe, 1985).  Peltzman’s input, for 
instance, centered on the relationship between “clients” and resource allocation by bureaucratic 
organizations.  Niskanen, conversely, clarifies the relation between bureaucratic power and 
outcomes that benefit these organizations – specifically, with respect to budgeting.  
As Bendor and Moe (1985) suggest, the conclusions made by many of the early 
researchers oversimplify the intricate relationships that influence bureaucratic behavior.  This led 
to analytical frameworks that were one dimensional. According to Bendor and Moe (1985), few 
researchers seriously considered the discrete and interdependent roles of bureaucrats, politicians, 
interest groups, and other actors that influence bureaucratic behavior.  Most bureaus, legislatures, 
and interest groups were analyzed as cohesive forces when, in fact, they act in more diffused and 
multifaceted ways.  Therefore, while identifying the specific attributes, players, or dimensions of 
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bureaucratic politics is important, it is insufficient for creating a framework for researching the 
topic comprehensively.    
Bendor and Moe’s (1985) theoretic research framework, which they term an “Adaptive 
Model of Politics,” more effectively examines the full scope of the phenomenon, which is 
essential for this project.  Because Bendor and Moe’s (1985) framework aggregates several 
models it allows for a multi-dimensional analysis of bureaucratic politics.  It does so by 
integrating critical elements of preceding models, which allows for more in-depth explorations of 
the various actor interactions that influence behavior within bureaucratic organizations.  More 
significantly, their model seeks to examine the outcomes of what they term “interest-
governmental outputs, budgets, and bureaucratic efficienc[ies]” that are determined by the 
“interdependent decisions of bureaucratic, legislative, and interest group participants” (p. 776). 
By design, the focus is on the various roles participants within a political system – both internal 
and external – have on organizational behavior. Their adaptive behavioral model is meant to be 
dynamic and was developed based on the previous work conducted by earlier behavioral 
traditionalists including Simon (1946); March and Simon (1958); Cyert and March (1963); 
Cohen, March and Olsen (1972); Axelrod (1976); and, Padgett (1980).  And just as important, 
their model reflects the limits of human decision-making, which reinforces the adaptive and 
dynamic nature of organizational behavior – both collectively and individually (North, 1990).  
Essential in this analysis is the idea that decision-makers adapt to their environments, which 
comports with earlier analysis by Barnard (1938), Selznick (1957), and Katz and Kahn (1966). 
Bendor and Moe (1985) were also critical of the early models of bureaucratic politics that 
strictly defined the concept in terms of conflicting resource allocation needs, as they felt it is too 
methodologically limited.   They believed the definitions advanced in previous research did not 
reflect the full range of motivations, actions, and tactics that encompass bureaucratic politics.  
These authors suggested that a more robust definition must include the politics that surround 
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implementing policy, the influence of power and authority, behavior within organizations where 
individual motivation and behavior manifest strictly for personal gain (Bendor and Moe, 1985).   
Bendor and Moe seemingly tapped into Mintzberg’s (1983) earlier thesis, which links 
social influence to organizational behavior.  In this regard, Mintzberg (1983) felt the best method 
for analyzing these relationships is through the lens of a power game.  He asserted that internal 
and external stakeholders exert pressure over others within an organization by controlling or 
influencing decisions and actions to satisfy their specific needs.  Therefore, to understand 
organizational behavior it is first necessary to identify the players that exert pressure, which is 
frequently perceived to be political in nature.  Likewise, Mintzberg (1983) echoed Erving 
Goffman’s seminal analysis of the dramaturgical perspective, which argued human actions are 
dependent upon time, place, and audience.  In this way, Mintzberg (1983) identifies the cast of 
internal and external actors who use power to affect organizational behavior and action.    
The external coalition is comprised of the owners, associates, employee associations, 
public, and influencers.  Conversely, the internal coalition encompasses the chief executive 
officer, operators (the workers), managers, technocrats (technical specialists), support staff, and 
what he terms the “ideology” of a firm.  These relationships are conceptualized in his iconic 
illustration he dubbed “The Essence of Organizational Structure” (Figure 1).  
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Figure 2:  "The Essence of Organizational Structure" reproduced from 
Mintzberg (1983) extracted from http://glori.kenan-
flagler.unc.edu/airspace/NUSarchive/SC2202/Institutions/Market/
Firm7.jpg 
Unfortunately, even Bendor and Moe’s (1985) analysis falls short of providing a 
comprehensive research framework, given the theoretic advances in the specific dimensions of 
bureaucratic politics.  As such, one must venture outside of the literature pertaining to 
bureaucratic politics and examine the research devoted to each of its dimensions – external and 
internal.  In this respect, the literature related to institutional and organizational politics 
adequately addresses the full spectrum of bureaucratic politics.   
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Institutional Politics.  Institutional politics, the external dimension of bureaucratic 
politics, has been a source of scholarly inquiry for nearly as long as sociology, political science, 
and public administration have existed (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Scott, 2008).  Early 
scholars, such as Wilson (1889) and Willoughby (1904), conceived of nations in terms of their 
political structures and legal systems, which they termed “political institutions.”  From the 1930s 
through the 1940s, scientists shifted their focus and began evaluating institutions and 
organizations from a behavioral perspective (Scott, 2008).  Simon’s (1955) concept of “bounded 
rationality,” for instance, served as the basis for the neo-institutionalism movement, which made 
this area of study a distinct theoretic perspective (Scott, 2008).  Simon (1955) posited that 
organizations adopt structures to cope with exogenous pressures and that people act rationally as 
they are constrained by limited information and rules they must abide by within an organization.  
Selznick (1957) expanded on Simon’s concept as he asserted that organizations are a collection of 
rational actors that infuse the entity with their respective values, many of which are formed 
outside the organization.     
In 1966, Katz and Kahn in their seminal book, The Social Psychology of Organizations, 
formalized what many scholars had previously claimed, but not formally established, that 
organizations are susceptible and react to their external environments.  The author’s theoretic 
framework bridged the gap that had previously existed between the micro analytical approach and 
the macro sociological perspective of organizational analysis.  Prior to Katz and Kahn’s (1966) 
work, organizational analysis had largely been rooted in Taylor’s scientific management or in 
Weber’s bureaucratic model (Scott, 2008).  Neither of these models, according to Katz and Kahn 
(1966), adequately dealt with the external forces of social change, which undeniably affect 
organizations internally.  Katz and Kahn’s (1966) open-systems theory, by contrast, viewed 
organizations as a system of behavioral patterns, which are interdependent, cyclical, and reliable.  
Systems theory, then, is a framework of knowledge focused on interdependent relationships – 
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both internal and external – that can profoundly influence the way actors behave within an 
organization.   
Katz and Kahn (1966) believed environmental influences are not problems needing 
eradication; rather, they are an integral part of a healthy open system. Therefore, it is vital to 
understand how these forces interact with one another and their external environment. 
Salancik and Pfeffer (1978) built on Katz and Kahn’s (1966) systems theory by observing 
that no organization is entirely self-sufficient; therefore, they become dependent upon external 
sources for resources.  DiMaggio and Powell (1983) later described this as a form of 
institutionalization.  As such, organizations must engage in exchanges with their external 
environment to survive.  Salancik and Pfeffer (1978) believed that understanding and evaluating 
the environment organizations operate within best explains the structures they choose and the 
actions they take.   
Salancik and Pfeffer (1978) also believed an organization’s external environment 
influences their internal activities and outcomes.  Given this relationship, they advanced the 
theory of resource dependence, which examines how external resources affect organizational 
behavior.  Salancik and Pfeffer (1978) asserted that an organization’s procurement process 
significantly influences its strategic and tactical decisions.  These decisions, in turn, inspire the 
structure the organization adopts and influences it critical activities in, including personnel 
recruitment, production processes, and contractual arrangements.  
Subsequent researchers took a more Weberian perspective by observing institutions 
include both formal structures, rules and procedures, which influence policy-makers and 
bureaucratic decision-makers (March and Olsen, 1984; Skocpol, 1986; Krasner, 1988).  
Conversely, other scholars, such as Moe (1984) and Shepsle (1989), viewed institutions as 
governance systems deliberately constructed by those wishing to promote or protect their own 
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interests (Scott, 2008).  As such, they believed institutions contain positive inducements and 
negative rules to motivate individuals, groups, and organizations.  
What has evolved, then, is a theory of institutions that today exhibits several 
characteristics that suggests the field has reached theoretic maturity (Scott, 2008): 
1. It has moved from looser to tighter conceptualizations of institutions and their 
distinctive features.  
2. It views relationships in determinative rather than interactive terms. 
3. It relies less on assertions than on evidence-based conclusions. 
4. Finally, it views institutions in terms of rational actions rather than of irrational 
behaviors. 
This theoretic progress has led to greater reliance upon measurable indicators that 
strengthen methodological reliability (Scott, 2008).  This, in turn, has allowed for more broad 
applications of its concepts to other academic fields (e.g., organizational ecology, law, social 
movements, and cultural sociology) as the field’s theoretic clarity increases.  As Shepsle and 
Bonchek (1997) observed, institutional analysis extends to “any political community,” which 
“institutionalizes procedures to deal with recurring, important problems…” (1997, p. 300).  What 
is enticing about Shepsle and Bonchek’s supposition, and most relevant for this project, is that 
institutions affect organizational decision-making, behaviors, and outcomes (1997, pp. 299-311). 
Unfortunately, despite the growing body of literature and converging theoretic 
framework, definitional consensus is still elusive, which leads to vigorous debates and disputes 
over what constitutes an “institution.”  The next section expands on the concept and provides a 
working definition useful for this research project. 
Toward a Working Definition of Institutions.  North advances one of the broadest 
definitions of institutions, which he asserts are the “rules of the game…where the humanly 
devised constraints…shape human interaction” (1990, p. 3).  While expansive, North’s definition 
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belies the concept’s sophistication as it is highly malleable depending on the lens used to analyze 
the phenomenon – e.g.,  economic, public policy, political, organizational, etc. (Powell and 
DiMaggio, 1991).  As Powell and DiMaggio (1991) note, theorists diverge along two basic points 
of contention: do institutions reflect individual preferences, or are they the result of collective 
outcomes that defy individual choice and action?  Many institutional economists and public 
choice theorists assume the former, as they contend individual actors construct institutions to 
influence organizational or policy outcomes.  Sociologists, by contrast, reject this proposition.  
They argue individuals filter the myriad of choices and decisions they face daily through their 
social networks, education, principles, and existing social conventions (Powell and DiMaggio, 
1991).      
Scott (2008) contends that for a clear definition of institutions to materialize, it is first 
necessary to understand the concepts three distinct properties:  
1. They resist change.  
2. They persevere and reproduce through generational transmission. 
3. They exhibit socially enduring features and provide stability across time and space.  
Accordingly, Scott (2008) notes these properties manifest in three ways, which he 
describes as “institutional pillars:” Regulative, Normative, and Cultural Cognitive.  In turn, these 
pillars use specific transference mechanisms, have explicit sources of legitimacy, and exhibit 
quantifiable transference indicators (Table 1).   
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REGULATIVE NORMATIVE 
CULTURAL-
COGNITIVE 
TRANSFERENCE 
ELEMENTS  
 Mechanisms of 
transference Coercive Normative Mimetic 
 Source of 
legitimacy Legally Sanctioned Morally Governed Culturally Supported 
 Indicators 
Rules, Laws, 
Sanctions Accreditation 
Shared logics of 
action, isomorphism 
(referenced as 
“Taken-for-
Grantedness”) 
CARRIERS  
 Symbolic 
Systems Rules, Laws Values, Expectations 
Categories, 
typifications, schema 
 Relational 
Systems 
Governance and 
power systems 
Regimes, authority 
systems 
Structural 
isomorphism 
 Routines 
Protocols, standard 
operating procedures 
Jobs, roles, obedience 
to duty Scripts 
 Artifacts 
Objects complying 
with mandated 
specifications 
Objects meeting 
conventions, 
standards 
Objects possessing 
symbolic value 
Table 1:  “Three Pillars of Institutions.”  Adapted from Scott (2008, pp. 51 and 79) 
Each pillar transmits institutional values into organizations through four distinct 
“carriers:” symbolic systems, relational systems, routines, and artifacts.  The transference 
mechanisms (coercive, normative, and mimetic isomorphism) are important to expand upon, as 
they serve as the foundation for building the survey instrument’s measures of respondents’ 
perceptions of institutional politics. 
Scott (1987) explains that most organizations adapt to their respective environment not 
only rationally, but, more often, they react to social and cultural pressures. These institutional 
pressures imprint their preferred organizational forms and actions through the three transference 
mechanisms. Studying these mechanisms, therefore, allows researchers to develop a deeper 
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understanding how and why organizations, within an institutional ecology, become increasingly 
similar over time (Scott, 1987).  The three institutional mechanisms used to influence 
organizations are coercive, normative, and mimetic isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
Coercive Isomorphism.  The first mechanism promoting institutionalization of 
organizations is called coercive isomorphism. Coercive isomorphism refers to the external 
pressures placed on an organization to conform to rules and practices considered important within 
an industry. Implicit in this mechanism is the threat of punishment or the use of force if an 
organization does not comply with standard practices.  For example, government mandates 
require defined reporting methods in specific regulated industries.  This, in turn, leads 
organizations to design systems to comply with these demands particularly when they are 
dependent upon government funding.   For fire departments, the federal government has 
mandated the use of a national incident management system (NIMS) in the aftermath of 9/11 for 
all levels of government.  Prior to this, fire agencies used a variety of systems that were not 
always compatible (Christen, Callsen, Miller, and Lord, 2011; International Association of Fire 
Chiefs [IAFC] and National Fire Protection Association [NFPA], 2009).  After years of using a 
coercive process, primarily through grant funding, NIMS is now the standard incident 
management system in use by most fire agencies throughout the country (IAFC and NFPA, 2009; 
Christen, Callsen, Miller, and Lord, 2011). 
Normative Isomorphism.  The second transmission mechanism is referred to as normative 
isomorphism and involves an intricate network of educational and professional institutions by 
which acceptable norms and practices are transmitted to actors and then integrated into individual 
organizations (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Scott, 2008).  One approach is to standardize the 
formal education an industry uses to convey a common body of knowledge, set of skills, 
techniques, methods, and processes.  For example, in the last two and a half decades, the National 
Fire Academy’s (NFA) Executive Fire Officer (EFO) program has become an increasingly 
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important normative process for educating chief officers.  The program, which began in 1985, is 
the profession’s unifying outlet for training and educating executive level officers to perform 
their jobs in a generally acceptable way within the industry.  In turn, EFO students and graduates 
integrate the lessons learned from the program into their department to facilitate industry 
acceptable standards (USFA, 2010).  
Mimetic Isomorphism.  The third institutional transmission mechanism, mimetic, helps 
organizations reduce uncertainty, minimize risk, ensure survival, and gain legitimacy within an 
industry.  Sources of uncertainty arise from rapidly evolving technology, ambiguous strategies, 
goals, and objectives, economic turmoil, and other dynamic environmental factors.  Mimetic 
isomorphism is an organization’s attempt to minimize these uncertainties by imitating the 
practices and procedures of other institutional organizations deemed to be influential or leaders 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Scott, 2008).  Imitation also legitimizes and gives an organization 
credibility within their respective industry despite the prospect that adoption of institutionalized 
policies, procedures, or culture may be inefficient or ineffective. 
Scott (2008) is careful to note that institutions are rarely homogeneous.  More often, 
organizations are influenced by a nearly limitless combination of pillars, transference elements, 
and carriers from numerous institutional environments.  He stresses, however, the more aligned 
an institution’s pillars are with its respective transference elements and carriers the greater the 
capacity it has to influence organizational structures, decisions, or structures.   
The one constant observed by most scholars is that institutions have significant influence 
over organizations including those in the public sphere (Gortner Nichols, and Ball, 2007; Powell 
and DiMaggio, 1991; Scott, 2008).  As Marsden, Cook and Kalleberg (1994) maintain, powerful 
external actors have the ability to mandate or advocate strongly for adopting specific practices, 
processes or structural forms, which advance their specific needs and preferences.  Institutional 
pressures channel through different organizational functions and actors, which influence how 
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managers receive and react to these demands.  These differentiated reception points serve as the 
basis for the practices adopted by and behaviors exhibited within organizations (Delmas and 
Toffel, 2008).  Institutional transmitter and receiving agents include nation-states, professionals, 
associations, marginal players, social movements, and rank and file organizational participants.  
The important take-away from Scott’s (2008) and Marsden, Cook and Kalleberg’s (1994) 
observations is that institutional actors are diverse, numerous, and different from industry to 
industry and organization to organization.  
Before we can examine the impact institutional politics have on organizations, it is first 
necessary to define organizations so as to distinguish them from institutions.   
Differentiating Organizations from Institutions.  Distinguishing organizations from 
institutions is important as it allows researchers and policy-makers to focus on root problems 
rather than on the means by which a problem is transmitted.  Failure to make this distinction may 
lead to a misappropriation of resources that do not address the structural issues (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977; North, 1990).  Unfortunately, finding a universal understanding of what constitutes 
an organization can be difficult.   
Daft (2007, p 11) defines organizations as deliberately structured and coordinated social 
entities engaged in interdependent activities linked to their external environment for the 
attainment of explicit goals.  He asserts that what makes organizations unique from other socially 
structured groups, including institutions, is that people interact to perform essential functions 
necessary for attaining stated goals.  As such, managers purposely structure processes and 
coordinate resources to achieve the organization’s mission (Daft , 2010).  North (1990) augments 
Daft’s definition by suggesting that organizations consist of groups of people collectively 
working toward shared goals.    
Surprisingly, some scholars have suggested organizations do not matter. They assert, 
instead, that organizations are simply mechanisms for individual or group actions and behaviors, 
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therefore the focus should be on people (North, 1990).  Wilson (1989), an expert on 
bureaucracies, adamantly rejected this view.  He asserted that an individual’s organizational 
accomplishments depend on “their having authority and resources with which to act” (p. 24).  
Moreover, he profoundly believed that public organizations are inherently different, thus 
individuals who occupy positions within these organizational types behave fundamentally 
different than those in private sector firms.  It therefore necessitates identifying the characteristics 
and ways public sector firms and, by extension their employees, differ from their private sector 
counterparts.  It is through this awareness that a clear delineation of the specific institutional 
influences can be understood and, potentially, measured.  
  Some scholars such as Gortner, Nichols, and Ball (2007) make a concerted effort to 
distinguish between private and public firms.5  These distinctions are necessary for better 
understanding how politics are a constant source of conflict for public sector managers.  
Gortner, Nichols, and Ball (2007) assert that the primary demarcation between public and 
private organizations is their respective missions and accountability mechanisms.  In short, 
private firms exist within a free market system for the exclusive purpose of realizing a profit.  
Ultimately, so long as the firm operates in a legal manner, its performance is only accountable to 
its owners.  Public sector organizations, by contrast, carry out a legal mandate and are 
accountable to its citizenry.  They supply a collective good or service that private sector 
organizations are either incapable or unwilling to provide (Gortner, Nichols, and Ball, 2007).   
 Perhaps the greatest distinction between private and public organizations is the purpose 
for their existence.  Rainey, Backoff and Levine (as cited in Gortner, Nichols, and Ball, 2007, p. 
24) provide the most complete understanding of these distinctions.  They deduce organizational 
types deviate along three lines: legal, economic, and political.  Of these, the legal, which 
                                                          
5 The authors also distinguish non-profits from the other two organizational forms. From their vantage 
point, however, the differences between public sector and non-profit organizations are relatively minor 
whereas the distinction between public and private sector organizations is far more pronounced.   
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advances the concept of accountability, and politics are the two most defining features of public 
sector organizations, which are also the most applicable concepts for this study. 
 Legal Accountability. The first legalistic difference between public and private entities is 
to whom members are accountable and for what purpose.  A public entity, particularly in a 
democratic society, is ultimately accountable to its electorate – be it at the local, state, or national 
level.   The concept of accountability vacillates depending on the wishes and demands of the 
public.  Thus, what might be acceptable at a given point in time may be impermissible at some 
later date.   Moreover, because the framers of the Constitution were careful to separate powers 
between branches and levels of government, what is acceptable at one level of government may 
not be at another (e.g., a local government cannot establish its own standing army. Conversely, 
under the 10 Amendment, the federal government cannot appoint the mayor of Denver, Colorado.  
All of this suggests a governmental body has specific constituencies it must serve.  Hyde (as cited 
in Gortner, Nichols, and Ball, 2007, p. 29) stipulates there are three distinctive points of service: 
customers (those whom the organization serves directly), clients (those with contractual 
relationships), and captives (those whom have no choice but to “deal” with the entity). 
 Participation in Political Process.  The second legalistic aspect of public sector 
organizations politics is the direct participation of its constituents in the decision-making process. 
This leads to public entities having to balance the competing interests of individuals, special 
interest groups, and the collective electorate.  Private firms, on the other hand, are mostly free of 
these forms of external forces, which permit them to focus on their primary task of maximizing 
profits.    
 Correspondingly, public organizations are constantly re-evaluating short- and long-range 
goals to meet their changing political climates.  In many instances, the environment changes after 
elections, thus long-term goals can be frustratingly elusive.  As a result, public managers develop 
different strategies to deal with this reality that differ from those of their private sector 
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counterparts.  For instance, managers achieve goals through a process of influence, negotiation, 
and compromise (Braybrooke and Lindblom, and Gawthrop as cited in Gortner, Nichols, and 
Ball, 2007).     
 The shifting political environment also leads to goal ambiguity.  That is to say, politicians 
habitually write laws using obscure language, which permits public sector managers to exercise 
broad authority when executing an agency’s mission.  It is not until expectations change or the 
public perceives an abuse of power that it becomes problematic (Gortner, Nichols, and Ball, 
2007).  
Although rudimentary, the definitions and basic differentiations of organizational types 
advanced in the previous section are sufficiently explanatory for this project in so much as they 
provide an adequate basis for analyzing how institutions affect organizations.  This is the focus of 
the next section.    
Organizational Adaption to Institutional Environments. The salient question for this 
project is “do institutions affect public sector organizations?”  In short, they most assuredly do.  
In fact, North (1990) states: 
[S]ocial scientists are just beginning to appreciate that the underlying institutional 
framework is the source of their current poor performance and are to grapple 
with ways to restructure the institutional framework to redirect incentives that 
will direct organizations along productivity-increasing paths. (p. 110) 
North’s (1990) observation presupposes that without a deeper understanding of 
institutions, effective policies cannot be developed to combat such societal ills as poverty and 
corruption, which traditional economic models deal with ineffectively.  
North’s (1990, pp. 111-112) research denotes the four ways institutions are vital for 
public administrative research:  
 Institutional theory links the polity and economics.  
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 Politics and economic performance are inexorably related.  
 Ideas and ideologies matter.  
 Lastly, but most relevant for this project, institutions affect individual and 
organizational behavior, which belies the traditional (outmoded) economic models of 
rational choice and market efficiencies.   
This leads to examining how organizations fit into larger institutional environments.  
Institutionalized organizations operate in complicated, value-oriented environments.  In order to 
survive, organizations turn their focus “outward’’ to appease influential constituents (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977).  Meyer and Scott (1983) suggest this influence leads to “institutionalized 
environments, [are] organizations are rewarded for establishing correct structures and processes” 
(p. 149).   
Most organizations adopt at least some level of collective behaviors and structures that 
reflect the values and expectations of their external stakeholders (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; 
Powell and DiMaggio, 1991).  This is more appropriately referred to as “organizational 
institutionalization,” which manifests in two dominate ways: structural design and organizational 
behavior (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991; Stinchcombe as cited in Scott, 2008).  
Organizational Structural Design.  The first effect institutionalism has on organizations 
is the selection or evolution of structural designs and organizational cultures that mirror those of 
their institutional environment.  As such, organizations tend to adopt the same level of structural 
and process complexity inherent within their institutional environments (Crank, 2003; Powell and 
DiMaggio, 1991; Scott, 2008).  For example, fire departments are under pressure to hire in a 
manner that reflects the demographic makeup of their communities, and, in fact, may be legally 
mandated to do so (Crank, 2003; Hulett, 2007; Hulett, Bendick, Thomas, and Moccio, 2008).  On 
the other hand, departments can be held legally accountable if they fail to use rational and 
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validated hiring processes. These institutional pressures force organizations to develop elaborate 
hiring policies, which may also conflict with their internal cultures (Crank, 2003).   
Organizational Behavior.  For this project, an equally significant issue is the influence 
intuitionalism has on organizational behavior – specifically with respect to politically oriented 
activities.  In order to balance conflicting institutional pressures, organizations loosely couple 
formal practices with actual behavior (Crank, 2003). The intricacy of constituent relations is dealt 
with by loosely coupling an agency’s formal positions or goals with their institution’s.  For 
example, fire departments are statutorily required to enforce fire codes that help save lives and 
minimize property damage.  This runs contrary to the institutional culture that covets fire 
response as the profession’s core service despite the statistical evidence demonstrating that code 
enforcement has significantly reduced deaths and property damage (USFA, 2009).  This creates a 
dichotomy where rank and file firefighters may resist education programs or enforcement 
activities designed to reduce the frequency and consequence of fires (Rivero, 2004).  Since 
institutionalized organizations respond to external stakeholder needs and expectations, some of 
which can conflict with other institutional and organizational cultural values, loose coupling 
enables rank and file employees to carry out the department’s primary mission.  Simultaneously, 
it allows administrators to attend to the needs of external constituents. 
Finally, “good faith” pervades organizational practices, impeding critical evaluation and 
supervision.  As observed in law enforcement, firefighters also regard the essentiality of their 
profession in such a way that it may also lead to less introspection of organizational practices that 
could lead to profound change (Crank, 2003).  To illustrate, emergency service supervisors are 
less likely to perceive corruption as anything more than an aberration, when there is no evidence 
to suggest the potential for a corrupt firefighter is not as statistically likely as it is in other 
professions.  
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Institutional theory, then, can yield insight into why organizations adopt specific 
strategies, management practices, or cultures (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 1992).  More 
importantly for this project are the political behaviors that manifest from external pressures.  
There are almost incalculable institutional groups that influence any given organization.  Some 
only affect specific industries (e.g., industry-specific trade groups) while others influence 
virtually all industries (e.g., unions).   
As Crank (2003) observed, emergency service agencies, such as police and fire 
departments, meet the operational definition of institutionalized organizations.  Because fire 
departments have deeply embedded institutionalized cultures (Bachtler and Brennan, 1995; Barr 
and Eversole, 2003), it influences strategic and operational decisions (Meyer and Scott, 1983; 
North, 1990; Schein, 1993).  To illustrate, although the primary focus is on public safety (e.g., 
emergency response, code enforcement, and education), fire departments integrate other values 
such as due process, hiring and promotional practices, and gender and racial equality.  These are 
important issues for external groups.  Fire departments, like other institutionalized organizations, 
selectively choose specific goals, strategies, and tactics to placate influential external stakeholders 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Hulett, Bendick, Thomas, and Moccio, 2008; Scott, 1992).  With 
respect to the fire service, the literature points to five institutions that influence local fire 
agencies:  elected officials, the Commission on Fire Accreditation International (CFAI), civil 
service boards, employee unions, and business groups (Gortner, Nichols, and Ball, 2007; 
Marsdenm, Cook and Kalleberg, 1994). 
 The first external group that influences public sector agencies is elected officials who 
hold organizational managers accountable for their actions and decisions.  Gortner, Nichols, and 
Ball (2007) note this type of accountability, however, is problematic on several levels.  First, it 
requires citizen involvement that may have minimal knowledge of the issues.  Second, not all 
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problems require passage of laws.  Finally, many governmental agencies are removed from the 
direct influence of elected officials yet they can still affect organizations in profound ways.   
 Powell and DiMaggio (1991) assert that a second external group exerting pressures on 
public organization is accreditation bodies.  They classify them as a form of normative 
isomorphism where organizations change through professionalization.  This is a process where an 
occupation collectively defines and universally adopts work conditions and methods of operation.  
In the last decade and a half, the fire service has gradually embraced accreditation, which is 
slowly professionalizing the industry (Rivero, 2004).  The purpose of fire service accreditation is 
to enable organizations to “examine past, current, and future service levels and internal 
performance and compare them to industry best practices” (found on the Commission on Fire 
Accreditation International [CFAI] About Accreditation and CFAI webpage, n.d.).  Ostensibly, 
this independent assessment helps fire departments improve performance by adhering to industry 
standards and “professionalizing” specific job functions – particularly those in management 
(Powell and DiMaggio, 1991).  Fire departments, unlike organizations in other industries (e.g., 
hospitals) enter into accreditation voluntarily.  As such, fire service accreditation is best evaluated 
as a form of normative isomorphism, which, despite its uneven acceptance, is slowly 
professionalizing the industry (Rivero, 2004; West and Wolf, 2006).  Unfortunately, because so 
few fire agencies have gone through the accreditation process, using it as one of the groups for 
assessing influence over organizations is impractical.      
The other institutional groups scholars identify as having influence over public sector 
organizations include unions (Johnson and Libecap, 1994; Kochan , Katz, and McKersie, 1986; 
Powell and DiMaggio, 1991; Scott, 2008), civil service boards (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991; 
Scott, 2008), and business groups such as homeowners, chamber of commerce, realtor, and 
builder associations (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991; Scott, 2008).  These groups, excluding CFAI 
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and civil service boards, 6 are the three institutional groups that used in the survey that assessed 
respondents’ perceptions how institutional politics influence management activities.   
Organizational Politics.  While impactful, institutional politics only explains 
bureaucratic politics from an external perspective.  To comprehend the true impact of the 
phenomenon, it is also necessary to examine its internal dimension more precisely defined as 
Organizational Politics.   
Organizational politics has been an area of research since the early 1960s with one of the 
earliest definitions originating from Burns (1961) who posited the phenomenon occurs when 
“others are made use of as resources in competitive situations” (p. 257).  Mayes and Allen (1977) 
expanded on this rudimentary definition by adding that it entails "influence to obtain ends" in a 
way that is not sanctioned by the organization (p. 675).  Like other sociological phenomena, 
organizational politics goes by many names, has numerous layers, and is perceived dissimilarly 
by different individuals (Vigoda, 2003).   
As noted previously, practitioners and some scholars, use the terms “office” and 
“organizational” politics interchangeably (DuBrin, 1981; Clarke, 1999 as cited in Phillips, 2004).  
While it may not create methodological issues, it can produce confusion as to which term is more 
academically appropriate (Vigoda, 2003; Vigoda-Gadot and Drory, 2006).  Many practitioners, 
for instance, consider “office politics” negatively, which conjures up images of manipulation, 
betrayal, and favoritism.  Rarely do laypersons consider politics a beneficial force (Velasquez, 
1982; Clarke, 1999 as cited in Phillips [dissertation], 2004).  Yet, this over simplification limits 
the understanding of its pervasiveness and impact – good and bad – on organizations (Vigoda, 
2003; Vigoda-Gadot and Drory, 2006).  This has led scholars to use the more academically 
acceptable term, organizational politics, to describe the phenomenon.   
                                                          
6 Civil service boards are excluded from the Perceptions of Institutional Politics (PIP) survey instrument, as 
a significant number of fire departments are not governed by these oversight groups.   
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Regardless of the term used, however, most scholars have traditionally described the 
organizational politics ominously.  Mintzberg (1983), for instance, gave rise to the notion that 
organizational politics are subversive and adversely affect organizations.  He contended 
‘‘[organizational politics are]...typically divisive, and above all in a technical sense, illegitimate - 
sanctioned neither by formal authority, accepted ideology, nor certified expertise’’ (p. 172).   
It was not until Ferris, Russ, and Fandt (1989), in their groundbreaking research, 
discovered that organizational politics have both positive and negative attributes.  They asserted 
“[organizational politics] is a social influence process in which behavior is strategically designed 
to maximize short-term or long-term self-interest, which is either consistent with or at the expense 
of others’ interests” (p. 210).   
Inherent in these definitions is the belief that organizations are political systems.  They 
are composed of interdependent members using power, influence, and partisan maneuvering to 
achieve their goals.  Given this, it is necessary to examine how political behaviors exist within 
organizations.  
Political Behaviors within Organizations.  As noted earlier, many scholars as well as 
most practitioners, regard organizational politics negatively as they broadly define it as the 
pursuit of self-interests at the expense of others.  If this is accurate, leaders must develop 
techniques to skillfully minimize, manage, or eliminate organizational politics if they to be 
successful.   
Unfortunately for many internal actors, politics are an unavoidable fact of organizational 
life.  They manifest because people do not always agree on issues of consequence due to 
conflicting value systems, diverse ideas, and differing personalities.  In turn, these frequently 
become the sources of internal tensions and conflict (Morgan, 1996).  French and Raven (1959), 
early organizational theorists, identified these conflicts as social pressures.  
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These researchers asserted that social pressure is one of the most influential aspects of 
power as it is inherent in every aspect of life (French and Raven, 1959).  They believed that 
power and influence are best analyzed in the context of the relationship between two “agents,” 
from two points of view: one agent exerting power and one receiving the behavior.  The 
researchers felt these relationships explain the effects of social influence, which, in turn, affects 
members of an organization.  Their theory focuses on change within a group due to social 
influence where an individual exerts power over others.  What they determined was that there are 
five sources of social power: reward, coercive, legitimate, expert, and referent.7  
Reward power is the ability one person has to control the benefits of another individual in 
exchange for specific behaviors or actions.  The second power base, coercive, is the ability or 
authority to exact punishment.  Legitimate power, is the perceived authority a person has within 
an organization.  The fourth, referent power, is when members identify with a specific group or 
individual.  Lastly, expert power is the authority granted a person based upon his or her 
specialized knowledge or expertise (French and Raven, 1959).  
Distinguishing the different power bases within organizations is important as it gives 
researchers and practitioners a better understanding how the phenomenon affects individual and 
group behavior (Fairholm, 1993).   
Burns (1961) also pointed out that most organizations either deliberately or inadvertently 
promote political strife as they encourage competition while simultaneously demanding 
collaboration.  People must work cooperatively in pursuit of an organization’s core mission yet 
often compete for limited resources, status, and advancement opportunities.  The hierarchical 
structure most organizations adopt, which is a rational subdivision of labor, also exacerbates 
conflict by limiting positions of power and control.  It is worth noting that individuals do not have 
to be overtly deceptive to end up engaging in organizational politics.  Political behavior is a 
                                                          
7 The authors also discussed a sixth type of influence, informational, but did not classify it as one of the 
primary bases of power. 
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natural response to the tensions created between individuals and their organizations.  Establishing 
budgets, determining work standards, day-to-day supervision, control of work, as well as the 
pursuit of opportunity and career advancement, all characterize the sophisticated forms of 
organizational politics.  Within the fire service, politics can result from the limited opportunities 
for career advancement to the highest levels within an organization (e.g., Battalion Chief, 
Assistant Chief, or Chief of the Department).  In fact, one might easily conclude that the larger 
the organization, the greater the potential for career-oriented politics to manifest as there are few 
opportunities for top rung positions such as Fire Chief  (i.e., every fire department irrespective of 
size has only one Fire Chief), yet there are more members who may aspire to these positions.   
DuBrin (2001) extends the notion of  political behavior by identifying six individual and 
organizational factors that contribute to its existence: 
1. Organizations with pyramid-shaped structures concentrate power at the top thus 
experience higher levels of internal politics.  As noted previously, hierarchical 
organizations have limited power positions to distribute amongst numerous 
subordinates; therefore, as personnel progress up the organizational structure, the 
competition for managerial positions becomes more intense, which causes additional 
internal conflict. 
2. The subjective application of performance standards leads employees to resort to 
politics as they perceive their accomplishments and suitability for promotion 
constrained by subjective or unfair evaluations.  Similarly, for managers who have no 
objective process for differentiating the effectiveness of subordinates, there is 
increased opportunity for favoritism. 
3. Uncertainty and turbulence that create an unstable and unpredictable environment, 
can also lead to politically motivated behavior.  For instance, corporate mergers or 
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downsizing cultivate insecurity that can contribute to internal infighting as employees 
maneuver to preserve jobs or power. 
4. Emotional insecurity or a lack confidence in one’s abilities can lead to political 
maneuvering as employees attempt to ingratiate themselves with superiors. 
5. Certain individuals are predisposed to having manipulative personalities that 
contribute to a politically oriented environment.  
6. When key members disagree on the organization’s strategic approach or specific 
goals it can lead to political infighting as factions vie for support for their respective 
preference. 
Given the above discussion, it does not take long to understand that the potential for 
organizational politics is virtually endless.  More importantly for organizational leaders are the 
responses to organizational politics.    
Responses to Organizational Politics.  The research clearly illustrates that various 
individuals and groups within an organization have an interest in influencing initiatives and 
policy outcomes.  It is the purpose of this research project, then, to determine to what extent 
organizational politics (an independent variable) influence management activities (a dependent 
variable).  The next section examines how organizational politics make managing public entities 
challenging.  Inherent in this locus of inquiry, is the reality that, while politics can have a 
detrimental effect on a variety of stakeholders, the emphasis of this research is on fire service 
supervisors.  Additionally, as noted previously, most research pertaining to bureaucratic politics, 
principally the organizational variant, has largely examined the phenomenon from a perspective 
that these forces are undesirable (Lowi, 1969; Vigoda, 2003; Vigoda-Gadot and Drory, 2006).  
This project follows this line of research despite the recognition that beneficial political behavior 
exists but will leave this for future research.   
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Researchers have linked internal politics to a number of organizational outcomes that 
include:  
 Affecting organizational structures (Zahra, 1991)   
 Constraining promotional opportunities (Vigoda, 2003) 
 Influencing managers, subordinates, and peers (Scandura, Graen, and Novak, 1986; 
Vigoda, 2003) 
 Exacerbating self-serving behavior (Biberman, 1985) 
 Lastly, inducing work-related stress, job anxiety, dissatisfaction, decreased 
organizational commitment, and diminished job performance (Kacmar and Baron, 
1999) 
While the aforementioned outcomes are important, the two most relevant for this project 
are inefficient resource allocation through the budget process and ineffectual leadership leading to 
diminished social capital.   
Inefficient Resource Allocation.  Early research into the phenomenon focused on the 
behaviors that manifest because of organizational politics.  One such behavioral outcome centers 
on conflict that arises from organizational resource sharing and allocation through budgeting 
(Bendor and Moe, 1977; Niskanen, 1971).  According to several scholars, organizational 
budgeting is the outcome of political bargaining amongst numerous actors and organizational 
units (Cyert and March, 1962; Pettigrew, 1977; Wildavsky and Swedlow, 2001).  These scholars 
determined that political processes are driven by such activities as coalition building, controlling 
critical information, bargaining, and empire building (Jones as cited in Vigoda-Gadot and Drory, 
2006, p. 219).  Bendor and Moe (1985) note, however, it is critical to distinguish between 
political and non-political claims against organizational resources.  An employee seeking a pay 
raise, for example, may not be overtly political, whereas a group of employees threatening to 
unionize to obtain similar raises is political.  Thus, the circumstances surrounding resource 
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demands are necessary for determining whether a specific action is implicitly political.  In this 
respect, it is useful to examine the literature that evolved from Niskanen’s (1971) budget 
maximizing framework, which illustrates expands on this facet of self-serving behavior.    
Niskanan (1971) argued that most budget maximizing behavior relates to specific 
benefits a manager receives by continually expanding his or her budget.8  These can include 
larger salaries, more power and prestige, stakeholder support, an enhanced reputation, and 
superior output.  He posited that if such rewards are tied to an agency’s culture, a bureaucrat will 
rationally strive to make their respective budget as robust as possible.   
Niskanen (1971) acknowledged that not all bureaucrats are driven by self-serving 
motives as some are truly desirous of serving the public’s interest.  He felt, however, that “It is 
impossible for anyone bureaucrat to act in the public interest, because of the limits on his 
information and the conflicting interests of others, regardless of his personal motivations” 
(Niskanen, 1971, p. 39).   
Certainly, budget maximization is but one manifestation of politically motivated behavior 
but is seemingly the most relevant for an increasingly weary public.  There are, however, less 
concrete, albeit equally destructive, variations that include over-inflated self-perceptions, taking 
credit for underserved success, and deflections of responsibility for failures (Johns as cited in 
Sutton and Straw, 1999).  The one not mentioned but is perhaps the most difficult to assess and 
quantify is dysfunctional leadership arising from an overtly political environment.   
Dysfunctional Leadership.  Understanding the effects leadership has on organizational 
performance is important, because many researchers regard this skill as one of the key forces for 
successful organizational performance (Avolio, Bass, and Jung, 1999; Lado , Boyd and Wright, 
1992; Rowe, 2001).  
Bass and Stogdill (1990) define leadership as: 
                                                          
8 It should be noted, Niskanen’s research centered on federal budgeting, thus a manager was influenced by 
external groups who could, then, influence legislatures in manner that benefits the manager 
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…an interaction between two or more members of a group that often involves structuring 
or restructuring of the situation and the perceptions and expectations of the member. 
Supervisors are agents of change – persons whose acts affect other people more than the 
people’s affect them.  Leadership occurs when one group member modifies the 
motivation or competencies of others in the group. (pp. 19-20)  
Bass and Stogdill (1990) also identified two dominate types of leadership styles: 
transformational and transactional.  
The transformational leader is someone who effectively inspires a common and shared 
vision throughout the organization. Transformational supervisors are unafraid of change and, in 
fact, seek innovative ways to evolve the organization. They look for opportunities despite real or 
perceived risks and prefer effectiveness over efficiency. Transformational supervisors do not 
merely react to their environment, they attempt to create or shape it to their advantage (Avolio, 
Bass and Jung, 1999). 
The transactional leader, by contrast, operates within the existing system with little 
inclination to change the organization or its culture. This type of leader avoids risk, seeks 
efficiency, and prefers process over substance (Bass and Stogdill, 1990). The transactional leader 
rewards subordinates for a desired behavior (Lowe, Galen, and Sivasubramaniam, 1996).  Thus, 
as Bass, and Graen and Cashman (as cited in Lowe, Galen, and Sivasubramaniam, 1996) pointed 
out, a skillful transactional leader is likely to be effective in stable, predictable environments 
where measurable performance indicators exist.  
Although transformational supervisors may use transactional methods to accomplish a 
specific task, they do so cautiously. Instead, they focus on value-oriented outcomes and 
individual needs that align with organizational goals and values (Bass, 1985, p. 20).   
As might be expected, much of the leadership research has fixated on its causal effects on 
individuals and organizations (House and Aditya, 1997).  One finding scholars have consistently 
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discovered is the positive correlation between transformational styles and organizational 
performance (Lowe, Galen, and Sivasubramaniam, 1996).  Although studies have found uneven 
correlations between transactional leadership and performance there is still enough evidence to 
suggest it adversely impacts organizational outcomes (Vigoda-Gadot, 2007).  This may be due to 
a transactional leader’s focus on short-term goals and objectives designed to create a compliant 
workforce or produce an expressed outcome.   
Researchers have also observed that effective leadership, primarily transformational, help 
organizations achieve their stated objectives more effectively by linking job performance to 
valued rewards and by ensuring employees have the resources needed to “get the job done” (Bass 
and Stogdill, 1990; Zhu, Chew and Spengler, 2005).  Successful leadership creates a unifying 
vision that effectively frames the organization’s strategic direction, adopts practices consistent 
with this vision, and builds consensus and commitment toward the vision (Avolio, Bass and Jung, 
1999; McShane and Von Glinow, 2000).  Some scholars such as Zhu, Chew and Spengler (2005) 
suggest that visionary leaders create organizational environments that have higher levels of 
cohesion, commitment, trust, and motivation, which, in turn, increase organizational 
performance.  What is less studied, thus less understood, is the effect subordinate behavior has on 
the leadership styles managers adopt.  What limited literature that does exist on this topic 
suggests that subordinate behavior can determine the leadership style used by managers (Manz 
and Sims, 1984; Yukl as cited in Deluga, 1988).  As Deluga (1988) notes  
…most behavior-based explorations of leadership such as the task-people dichotomy fail 
to specify how a subordinate's behavior might be associated with a superior's leadership 
style. An understanding of these influencing systems [is] an important area needing 
systematic investigation…which might provide the concepts and tools necessary for 
effective leadership political analysis.  (p. 360)   
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Yates (as cited in Deluga, 1988) argues that studying subordinates’ roles in dictating the 
type of leadership style chosen may also help explain an organization’s political environment.   
Vigoda-Gadot and Drory (2006) have noted that increased perceptions of organizational politics 
cause managers to adopt a more transactional style of leadership.    
Conversely, House (1995) asserted good leadership, transformational, leads to positive 
organizational behavior including a heightened awareness of organizational values, increased 
effort, and a belief in the collective good over self-interest.  It seems clear, given the research, 
that “good” leadership styles (e.g., transformational) facilitate organizational behavior conducive 
to lower POP.  Poor leadership, regardless of its origins (e.g., the leadership style managers 
choose independently or because of the actions subordinates engage in) can lead to distrust, low 
morale, and diminished positive perceptions of the organization by its members and the public 
(Vigoda, 2003; Vigoda-Gadot and Drory, 2006).  This, by contrast, leads to higher level of POP.  
The last point, diminished perceptions of an organization by the public, is especially 
relevant as it pertains to the creation or destruction of “social capital” (Zhengdong, 2011).  Thus, 
examining how organizational politics, through ineffectual leadership, can lead to dwindling 
social capital warrants additional attention.  
Although no consensus exists amongst scholars for defining social capital, generally it is 
"the ability of actors to secure benefits by virtue of membership in social networks or other social 
structures" (Portes, 1998, p. 6). Wilson (1997, p. 753-754) advances the idea that five distinct 
skill sets are necessary for building social capital:  
1 Communication skills - the ability to "hear" and transmit information. 
2 Relationship skills - build mutual respect, understanding, trust, and empathy. 
3 Group process skills - allow for effective conflict resolution; group facilitation; 
collaborative problem-solving and decision-making; team-building; and, celebration, 
ritual and appreciation. 
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4 Networking skills - create linkages and networks within and outside a community.  
5 Supervisorship skills - focus on supervisors as coaches, change agents; visionaries; 
and empowers others.9 
Social capital, like other resources, can be created, expanded, contracted, or destroyed 
(Beaman, 2002).  Few, organizations, public or private, are immune from the influences 
organizational politics has on either creating or destroying social capital.  In large part, this is due 
to the networked nature of the phenomenon, which links internal and external stakeholders 
(Willem and Scarbrough, 2006; Brass, and Burkhardt, 1993).   
As Kouzes (as cited in Beaman, 2002) notes,  
The new currency won't be intellectual capital. It will be social capital-the collective 
value of whom we know and what we'll do for each other. When social connections are 
strong and numerous, there is more trust, reciprocity, information flow, collective action, 
happiness, and, by the way, greater wealth. (p. 253)  
Given the untapped potential of social capital, it is no wonder researchers are increasingly 
devoting attention to the study of this concept (Castiglione, Von Deth, and Wolleb, 2008).  
Moreover, leadership plays a particularly important role in building effective social capital, 
which, in turn, influences how the public views a public organization (Brass in Zaccaro and 
Klimoski, 2001). 
As Stam and Elfring (2008) point out, social capital is embedded through executive 
leaders’ external networks.  Moreover, proper cultivation of social capital helps facilitate 
innovation and forward-thinking action.  This makes the resource unique to each organization 
thus can be difficult to quantify and equally problematic to replicate by other organizations (Stam 
and Elfring, 2008).  What is most obvious, however, is that political obstacles and maneuvering 
can undermine an organization's ability to build social capital (Stam and Elfring, 2008).  Failure 
                                                          
9 In no way are these definitions meant to be inclusive. Wilson effectively summarizes these five skills, but 
provides an exhaustive list other scholars have advanced.  
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to recognize this connection can cause organizational leaders to underutilize or misallocate 
human capital necessary for building social capital (Wilson, 1997).  
Measuring Bureaucratic Politics 
 It should be obvious to the reader by now that both dimensions of bureaucratic politics, 
institutional and organizational, can, and often do, affect both organizational and individual 
actions, behaviors, and outcomes.  The challenge for researchers is how best to measure these 
effects.  The scope of this project, though, is not to measure each of these effects; rather, it 
focuses on only two measures of bureaucratic politics: fire supervisors’ awareness of its existence 
and their perceived effect on select management functions.  The following sections detail the two 
measures that have been used in previous studies to measure the perceived existence of external 
(institutional) and internal (organizational) politics.10   
Measures of Institutional Politics.  As was the case with defining institutions, 
measuring this form of politics is equally challenging.  Scott (2008) asserts there are two 
methodological bases for analyzing institutional politics:  naturalistic and agent-based.   
The naturalistic approach examines how spontaneous and uncoordinated social 
interactions embed institutional processes into organizations.  This normalization occurs 
throughout an institution’s ecology as a collective network of shared beliefs that legitimize 
organizations that adopt practices and processes deemed “acceptable” (Scott, 2008). 
The second approach, agent-based, is rooted in the interests of various stakeholders, 
which stresses the intentionality of political actors who use their power and authority to influence 
organizational actions, and decisions (DiMaggio, 1991; Scott, 2008).  The latter approach is the 
basis used for this project to measure the institutional pressures fire service supervisors perceive 
to exist and believe affect their managerial activities.   
                                                          
10 The methodology section details how this study operationalizes management activities so that it captures 
the effect bureaucratic politics haves on each of them.   
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Further complicating the analysis of institutions, Scott (2008) identifies six levels a 
researcher can choose to focus on: transnational levels, societal, organizational field, 
organizational population, individual organizations, and organizational subsystem. 
 Transnational- Level –focuses on governance mechanisms of international politics 
and economics.  It is a multi-level and multi-layered process characterized by a 
complex set of competing and, often, conflicting actors and logics (Meyer, Boli, 
Thomas, Ramirez, Francisco , 1997). 
 Societal- Level – focuses on the historical and path-dependent conditions that lead to 
institutions created to regulate economic activity (North, 1991). 
 Organizational Field-Level – specific organizational field with gradual development 
that defines players, boundaries, and rules for dispute resolution, agencies and 
interests more apparent during creation of an institution than during routine operation 
of existing field (DiMaggio, 1991). 
 Organizational Population- Level – creation of new organizational forms of same 
type in particular historical periods, organizational “genetics” (Stinchcombe and 
Suchman as cited in Scott, 2008). 
 Individual Organization-level – analyzes an institution’s ecology, with a variety of 
inter-related and dependent organizations including suppliers, consumers, regulatory 
agencies, and competitors (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
 Organizational Subsystem-level – the last level of analysis focuses on the subsystems 
that exist within an organization, which are susceptible to institutional pressures.  In 
turn, actors within these subsystems act as receptors for their respective institutions 
(e.g., human resources, finance, emergency management) (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983)   
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Despite broad consensus amongst institutional scholars regarding the sources and impact 
of institutional politics, there are few well-developed quantitative instruments used to measure 
their existence and influence on organizations.  In fact, an exhaustive review of the literature 
uncovered only two survey instruments that explicitly measure institutional pressures on 
organizations: the Level of Institutionalization (LoIn) and Union Pressure scales.    
Goodman, McLeroy, Steckler, and Hoyle (1993) developed and used the Level of 
Institutionalization or LoIn scale to assess the extent to which national health promotion 
programs integrate into individual health care organizations.  In their study, Goodman et al. 
(1993) used the LoIn scale to assess how institutionalized national diabetes programs had become 
in 102 general hospitals and 30 home health agencies in Maryland and Pennsylvania.  The 
instrument attempted to measure the degree to which four organizational subsystems (production, 
maintenance, supportive, and managerial) achieve what the authors described as “passage,” 
“routinization,” and “niche saturation.”   
According to the authors, passage reflects the first step towards institutionalizing a 
program.  It entails formalizing and implementing program plans (production), providing 
financial resources (support), and developing an organizational structure to maintain the program 
(managerial).  Routines, the second step toward institutionalization, involve processes that 
engrain programs internally.  For instance, a program reaches “routinization” when it receives 
annual budgets and remains intact after an organizational restructuring.   
Lastly, niche saturation, the third and final institutional step, is achieved when the 
program achieves its optimal state within the organization.  For instance, this state is achieved 
when a program has adequate funding, staffing, and is internally perceived as essential.   
From these constructs, the researchers developed a 15-item survey, which tested their 
eight-factor model.  These factors were: 
1. Factor I: Routinization of program production; 
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2. Factor II: Niche saturation of program production; 
3. Factor III: Routinization of program maintenance;  
4. Factor IV: Niche saturation of program maintenance;  
5. Factor V: Routinization of program support;  
6. Factor VI: Niche saturation of program support; 
7. Factor VII: Routinization of program management; 
8. Factor VIII: Niche saturation of program management. 
The researchers assumed that if a program had developed policies and received initial 
funding it had achieved the first step toward institutionalizing the program within the 
organization.  Therefore, according to the researcher, answering the survey questions pertaining 
to the second step indicated step one had been achieved.   
The researcher found a high degree of incremental fit and internal consistency indicating 
their hypothesis for their eight-factor model and their links to niche saturation and routines are 
consistent with institutionalization.  They are careful to note, however, that the model requires 
further testing and is not generalizable to a larger population or other industries (Goodman et al., 
1993) 
The second institutional pressure measurement, the Union Pressure Scale, is a narrower 
assessment of institutional pressure than the LoIn.  The Union Pressure Scale was utilized as part 
of the National Science Foundation’s 1991 comprehensive National Organizations Study (NOS).  
The NOS was conducted as a multipurpose, multi-investigator project that produced a data-base 
of survey information that social researchers have subsequently used to answer an assortment of 
organization behavioral questions (Marsden, Cook, and Knoke, 1996).  Because the scale did not 
specifically ask informants to estimate the degree to which their respective workforce was 
organized by a union, the researchers had to rely upon a series of questions to determine their 
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existence.  Specifically, the instrument asked three questions, which presumably allowed the 
researchers to determine the presence of a union: 
1. Is formal training is offered because of union contracts? 
2. Are union negations are somewhat/very important for determining wages? 
3. Will union relations be perceived to be a problem in the next three years?     
Kalleberg, Cook and Knoke (Kalleberg as cited in 1996, pp. 45-67) found a 0.62 
correlation (or, R2 = 0.38) with respondents’ self-reporting unionization, which indicated the 
Union Pressure Scale, may be a weak reflection of the presence of unions in public sector 
organizations.  Unfortunately, the questions utilized for the NOS survey are inadequate for this 
research project.  Respondents for this project were asked directly how they perceive  unions 
impact four management activities (Appendix A).     
Woodruff (2006) argues the reason institutional politics are so difficult to measure is that 
they manifest diffusely and in nearly incalculable ways.  It, therefore, may require an assessment 
tool that can evaluate a specific facet of institutional pressures as they are perceived to exist.  As 
such, this research project uses a survey instrument that assesses fire service supervisors’ 
perceived existence of institutional politics and their perceived impact on select management 
activities (Appendix).  The next section details the internal measures of organizational politics. 
Measures of Organizational Politics.  The most widely recognized method for 
evaluating organizational politics is through perceptual analyses, defined more precisely as 
Perceptions of Organizational Politics (POP).  Most studies of organizational politics today are 
almost entirely based on Ferris, Russ, and Fandt’s theoretical framework first advanced in 1989 
(Brubaker, 2012; Vigoda-Gadot, 2006). The model developed by Ferris, Russ and Fandt (1989) 
expanded on earlier organizational theory by suggesting there are causal relationships between 
perceptions of organizational politics and outcomes.   
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To test this theory, Kacmar  and Ferris (1991) developed an early survey using a 31-item 
scale.  Through a series of subsequent studies they eventually condensed the instrument to a 15-
item, three-factor scale that measures general political behavior, “go along to get ahead” attitudes, 
and political rewards in the form of pay and promotions.  Overall, they found the reliability of the 
final scale was 0.87, which makes it the most reliable and validated POP survey in use today 
(Vigoda-Gadot, 2006; Brubaker, 2012).  This makes it an appropriate survey to measure fire 
supervisors’ internal perceptions of bureaucratic politics.   
Variable Selection 
Selecting the variables used in statistical analysis, particularly those that facilitate 
predictive modeling, is crucial.  In practice, it is common for a researcher to have scrutinized a 
large number of prospective predictive variables for final selection in a model (Forsberg, 2011).  
As Wu and Liu (2009) point out, it is essential to eliminate irrelevant predictors in the final model 
as it makes interpreting its validity difficult, and, worse still, can decrease its predictive ability.  
This requires a researcher to carefully review the literature in order to find variables that have 
high predictive capability.  Accordingly, the previous section identified the numerous variables 
that affect the perceptions of institutional and organizational politics as well as the outcome these 
phenomena produce through a comprehensive literature review.  The following section details the 
specific independent and dependent variables used for this project. 
Independent Variables.    The independent variables used for the survey instrument 
stemmed from an analysis of the various groups that have a vested interest in policy outputs or 
outcomes.  This analysis took into consideration the various interest groups that are frequently 
found within and external to bureaucratic organizations.  Scholars such as Johnson and Libecap 
(1994), North (1990), Powell and DiMaggio, 1991, Rubin (2000), Vigoda, 2003, Vigoda-Gadot 
and Drory, 2006, and Wilson (1989) each detail the various internal or external interest groups 
that influence policy decisions.  Accordingly, the literature supports using the following six 
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institutional and organizational groups to help survey respondents perceive to impact four 
management activities (Figure 3): 
 Institutional Groups  
o Local elected officials (also referenced as politicians) 
o Unions or collective bargaining units 
o Local business groups or organizations (e.g., homeowners, chamber of 
commerce, realtor, builder associations, etc.)    
 Organizational Groups  
o Chief Officers (Battalion Chief or higher) 
o Rank and File Operational Personnel (Captain or lower) 
o Other internal stakeholder group excluding those listed above (support staff, 
standing committees, special workgroups, task forces, etc.). 
This project also tested the effect PIP and POP scores (the independent variables) have on 
four management activities (the dependent variables) (Figure 3): 
 Budgeting  
 Social Capital 
 Personnel Management 
 Strategic Planning 
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Figure 3: The first set of independent and dependent research variables 
selected for the study. 
Dependent Variables.  Defining the core responsibilities of fire department supervisors 
is essential for establishing one set of dependent variables that studied for this research project.   
These dependent variables were derived from numerous scholarly sources and prominent 
fire service management textbooks (Barr and Eversole, 2003; Daft, 1995, 2005; Hunt , Osborn 
and Schermerhorn, 1997; Starling, 2002).  An organization’s capacity to fulfill its mission relies 
on the collective ability of its supervisors to execute their prescribed management responsibilities 
(Barr and Eversole, 2003; Daft, 1995, 2005; Hunt , Osborn and Schermerhorn, 1997; Starling, 
2002).  These authors identify four core management functions managers regularly engage in: 
planning, organizing, controlling, and leading (Barr and Eversole, 2003; Daft, 1995, 2005; Hunt , 
Osborn and Schermerhorn, 1997; Starling, 2002).  As outlined in the preceding section, the 
existence and influence of bureaucratic politics can profoundly affect a supervisor’s ability to 
manage his or her prescribed duties.  In order to measure the perceived impact bureaucratic 
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politics have on a supervisor’s ability to manage day-to-day operations, make decisions, and 
implement change initiatives, the researcher identified one activity for each management 
function:  
 Strategic planning (planning);  
 Budgeting (controlling);  
 Personnel management (organizing);  
 Social capital management (leading). 
The following section details each management function and the four activities chosen 
for the survey instrument. 
Planning.  Planning occurs in different ways and at all levels of an organization. At its 
highest echelon, planning involves establishing the organization’s mission, vision, and goals. As a 
part of this process, CEOs develop strategies for achieving organizational goals and objectives, 
which are typically detailed in a comprehensive strategic plan (Daft, 1995; Daft and Marcic, 
2001; Starling, 2002).  An additional planning activity is policy development, which helps 
standardize critical processes or procedures (Daft, 2009).  From a fire department perspective, 
these can include Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), Standard Operating Guidelines (SOGs), 
Field Operating Guidelines (FOGs), Directives or policies and procedures, (Bachtler and 
Brennan, 1995; Barr, and Eversole, 2003; IAFC, 2006). 
Controlling.  Once the necessary resources are identified, they must be acquired and 
adequate controls established so managers can effectively use them to carry out their assigned 
responsibilities (Daft, 1995; Daft and Marcic, 2001; Starling, 2002).  As such, the process of 
controlling involves evaluating whether the organizational goals and objectives are being met and 
correcting them when they are not.  One method of control is through budget development and 
monitoring.  Budget formulation is an activity that falls directly under the domain of the fire 
manager and is typically considered a way of allocating and controlling limited resources (Daft, 
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1995; Daft and Marcic, 2010; Starling, 2002).  A second method of control is establishing 
performance standards that help managers determine whether allocated resources are meeting 
organizational goals and objectives resources (Daft, 1995; Daft and Marcic, 2001).  The most 
common performance measure in the fire service is the use of response times (Flynn , 2009).  The 
NFPA defines response time as the time it takes to receive an initial call for assistance to the first 
fire apparatus’s arrival on scene (Flynn, 2009).   The NFPA sets standards for each phase of the 
response time process (Flynn, 2009).     
Organizing.  Once vital resources are acquired, they must be organized in ways that 
support organizational strategic goals and objectives.  One critical resource is human capital 
(Daft, 1995; Daft and Marcic, 2001; Starling, 2002).  This process involves recruiting, hiring, 
making assignments, assisting workers carry out assignments, creating and interpreting policies, 
and managing work performance (Daft, 1995; Daft and Marcic, 2001; Starling, 2002).  A second 
aspect of organizing is the ability of leaders to implement and manage change, which is essential 
for organizations to adequately adapt to their evolving environments (Daft , 2009). 
Leading.  The last management function centers on leading organizations.  This process 
includes effectively motivating, communicating, and managing teams (Daft, 1995; Daft and 
Marcic, 2001; Starling, 2002). An essential aspect of leading, only recently recognized is the 
creation of social capital, which was earlier defined as "the ability of actors to secure benefits by 
virtue of membership in social networks or other social structures" (Portes, 1998, p. 6). This 
project operationalizes social capital as creating positive or negative images of the department. A 
second function of leading is the ability to effectively communicate both within and external to 
the organization (Daft, 1995; Daft and Marcic, 2001).  This entails a complicated set of formal 
and informal skills that enable leaders to communicate their specific goals, objectives, and 
directions to subordinates and other stakeholders (Daft, 1995; Daft and Marcic, 2001; Starling, 
2002).   
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Certainly, organization development scholars have identified more than these four 
management activities (Daft, 1995; Daft and Marcic, 2001; Starling, 2002).11   However, to 
facilitate development of a useful and manageable survey instrument only one activity per core 
function was evaluated.  Later studies should expand on this list and add activities from each 
management function to provide a more inclusive analysis.  
The second set of dependent variables tested for this project assessed the effect 
respondent demographic information (the independent variables) has on PIP and POP scores (the 
dependent variables) (Figure 4).  
 
 
 
Figure 4: The second set of independent and dependent research 
variables selected for the study. 
With a comprehensive review of the literature complete, it is time to turn attention to the 
research methodology used to study fire service supervisors’ perceived existence and impact of 
both dimensions of bureaucratic politics (institutional and organizational). 
                                                          
11 Other scholars expand on these management functions to include such activities as directing or staffing. 
Others use several of the aforementioned terms interchangeably.  For instance, some use the term directing 
in place of leading.  For the purpose of this project, the four core management functions and resultant 
activities are consistent with those of prominent management scholars referenced in the text.     
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 
As noted several times, the underlying research questions for this project center on 
understanding the extent to which fire service supervisors perceive the existence bureaucratic 
politics (internal and external) and how they perceive their impact on managing specific 
activities.  Accordingly, the author advances five hypotheses that benefit from using statistical 
testing procedures.  These techniques attempted to first determine cause-effect relationships 
between respondents’ demographic characteristics and perceived existence of institutional and 
organizational politics.  Next, the statistical analysis attempted to ascertain the perceived impact 
bureaucratic politics have on supervisors’ abilities to execute the aforementioned management 
activities. 
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Non-Experimental Research Design 
This project uses non-experimental research where the researcher, as Kerlinger (as cited 
in Black, 1999) states,  
…does not have direct control of independent variables because their manifestations have 
already occurred or because they cannot be manipulated.  Inferences about relations 
among variables are made, without direct intervention, from concomitant variation of 
independent and dependent variables (p. 70).  
This form of research investigates cause and effect relationships by “observing existing 
consequences and searching back through the data to identify probable causal factors” (Isaac and 
Michael, 1997, p. 54).  Since this project examines fire service supervisors’ perceptions and 
outcomes, a non-experimental research design is appropriate, because the researcher cannot 
control the independent variables. 
Unit of Analysis 
Fire service supervisors are the unit of analysis for this project as they are in the unique 
position of having to deal with the cumulative effects of both internal and external political 
pressures (Bachtler and Brennan, 1995; Grant and Hoover, 1994; Fleming, 2010).  These forces 
stem from unions, internal power struggles, politicians, business groups, and community activists, 
to name but a few.  Fire supervisors, in turn, must contend with these politicized influences in a 
way that still permits them to successfully manage their respective area of responsibility.  
Additionally, fire supervisors, like managers in other industries, must carry out their 
organization’s mission in an effective and fiscally efficient manner (Bachtler and Brennan, 1995; 
Grant and Hoover, 1994; Fleming, 2010).  They accomplish this by executing the four primary 
management functions (planning, organizing, directing, and controlling), which were detailed in 
the dependent variable discussion.   
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Survey Instrument Overview 
To answer the research questions, this study used a survey instrument that collected data 
necessary for answering the research questions and test the hypotheses.  Surveys are one of the 
most common designs in social science research as they are an expedient method for collecting 
data from a large and dispersed population.  Babbie (as cited in Brownrigg-Innes, 2004) states 
that survey-based research is “probably the best method available to the social researcher who is 
interested in collecting original data for describing a population too large to observe directly” (p. 
82).  For these reasons, a survey instrument was an appropriate data collection tool for this 
research project.  
The survey instrument allowed for the collection of data that cumulated scores based on a 
respondent’s perceptions of institutional and organizational politics.  Individual and departmental 
demographics constitute the other independent variables used for analysis and mirror their use by 
several scholars including Brownrigg-Innes (2004), Tararka (2009), and Crank (2003).   
    In total, the survey consisted of 60 analytical questions segmented into two sections 
(Appendix):12  
 Section I: Perceptions and Impact of Politics 
 Section II: Demographic Characteristics  
Section I consists of 60 questions, each using a standard five point Likert scale.13 The 
selection of a Likert scale was deliberate as it allows for measuring both dimensions of 
bureaucratic politics and their impact on the four management activities.  Likert scales permit 
respondents to exercise some relative level of individual subjectivity in their responses.  These 
responses, then, fall within a continuum of choices that presumably capture the extreme ends 
                                                          
12 A fourth section is provided for respondent feedback and, as such, provides no analytical benefit for this 
project. Its purpose is strictly to provide information that will help improve the survey instrument for future 
use.   
13 Several questions (#1, 2, and 33-40) ask one question that a respondent applies to each of the eight sub-
questions.  
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(Dawis , 1987).  The Likert scale's convenience and ease of use, however, must be tempered with 
the reality that validity of the measurement scale and the reliability of responses must be 
rigorously evaluated (Dawis, 1987).  Subsequent sections of this paper explicitly address these 
issues.  
From a respondent’s perspective, the survey instrument does not distinguish between the 
three subsections that constitute Section I: perceptions of organizational politics (POP), 
perceptions of institutional politics (PIP) and their impact on management activities.  To 
determine a respondent’s POP, Question #3 summates the responses to 15 sub-questions yielding 
scores ranging from 15-75.  Likewise, question #4 18-32 summates the responses to 15 sub-
questions yielding scores ranging from 15-75.  Finally, questions #5-8 measure how a respondent 
perceives the impact both dimensions have on the four management tasks.  All three scales in 
Section I summate the responses so that the larger the score for each scale the higher the level of 
POP, PIP or their perceived influence on each of the management activities.   
The use of summated scoring enables a researcher to ask a series of questions designed to 
better gauge a respondent’s perceptions of politics, which helps reduce bias and increase the 
instrument’s reliability (Fink and Kosecoff, 1998).  Section II asks respondents to reveal 
demographic information centered on individual and their home agency’s characteristics. These 
questions are forced choice responses, which permit the researcher to capture information that is 
consistent between respondents as well as other survey instruments. This allows for cross analysis 
of data so that trends might emerge along specific demographic lines. For example, it might be 
instructive to know whether certain political activities are more prevalent in municipal-based fire 
departments relative to fire districts.  Alternatively, does the rank influence a respondent’s 
perspective on bureaucratic politics and their impact?  These are all useful questions researchers 
might build upon in future studies to advance the understanding of bureaucratic institutions. 
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Current practitioners, likewise, might use the information harvested from the study to help 
formulate strategies to deal with particular types of bureaucratic politics. 
Sample Population 
Selecting an adequate sample is a challenge for any quantitative research project (Leedy, 
1993).  In fact, Leedy (1993, p. 93) emphasizes “the sample should be so carefully chosen 
that…the researcher is able to see all the characteristics of the total population…that he would see 
them were he actually to inspect the totality of the universe of data.”  This is particularly critical 
when conducting multivariate analysis and was the technique used for this project (Leedy, 1993). 
The rationale being that the appropriate sample size allows for more accurate statistical inferences 
of the larger population (Cresswell, 2008; Fink and Kosecoff, 1998; Leedy, 1993).  To achieve a 
statistically relevant sample size this study used a stratified sampling strategy using fire agencies 
throughout the United States.14   
A stratified sampling procedure divides the population into groups based on specific 
characteristics such as gender, age, organizational type, governance structure, etc.  Then, a 
random or systematic sampling technique is used to pull data from each of these strata.   
For this project, the most accessible and expansive database of U.S. fire departments is 
the United States Fire Administration’s (USFA) fire department census.  The USFA maintains a 
database of demographic information of fire departments where   officials of each agency self-
registers and enters data about their respective agencies.  According to the “National Fire 
Department Census Quick Facts,” webpage, last updated January of 2012, the USFA compiles 
and maintains rudimentary information on approximately 26,482 (i.e., primarily department 
name, city and state located).  In 2010 the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) estimated 
there were U.S. 30,125 fire departments, which means roughly 3,600 fire departments are not 
                                                          
14 To achieve stratification, the sample population included different fire department governance types: 
municipal, county, and special district departments and consisted of agencies from rural, suburban, and 
urban locations.  
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registered in the USFA census database.  Of those fire agencies that contributed more detailed 
information in USFA’s database (26,359 agencies) reported having an aggregate population of 
1,190,000 personnel. This included career, volunteer, and paid per call firefighters as well as 
civilian staff and non-firefighting personnel.  For strictly firefighting personnel, the census 
reported there were 1,044,300 active career, volunteer, and paid per call firefighters, which 
represented nearly eighty-eight percent of the registered departments' personnel for 2012. 
The USFA census also captured the types of department that exist within the registry.  
For this information the USFA uses the NFPA four fire department classifications: 
 Career -  100 percent of a department's firefighters are career;  
 Mostly Career - 51-99 percent of a department's firefighters are career;  
 Mostly Volunteer - 1-50 percent of a department's firefighters are career;  
 Volunteer - 100 percent of a department's firefighters are volunteer.  
Accordingly, Table 2 delineates USFA registered fire departments by both type and 
region.   
 All Fire Department  
Types Volunteer 
Mostly 
Volunteer Mostly Career Career 
 Total No. 
of 
Registere
d Depts. 
% of All 
Regions 
Total 
% Per  
Region 
No. of 
Fire 
Depts. 
% Per  
Region 
No. of 
Fire 
Depts. 
% Per  
Region 
No. of 
Fire 
Depts. 
% Per  
Region 
No. of 
Fire 
Depts. 
All 
Regions 
26,359 N/A 71% 18,715 16% 4,217 5% 1,318 8% 2,109 
North- 
East 
5,008 19% 71% 18,715 17% 4,481 4% 1,054 8% 2,109 
South 8,962 34% 63% 16,606 18% 4,745 7% 1,845 12% 3,163 
Mid- 
West 
8,171 31% 80% 21,087 11% 2,899 3% 791 6% 1,582 
West 3,427 13% 52% 13,707 29% 7,644 7% 1,845 12% 3,163 
Table 2: USFA census of self-registered U.S. fire departments. 
 Unfortunately, there is no empirical data indicating what the total population of fire 
supervisors is in the U.S.  Therefore, to calculate an estimate of the entire population of U.S. fire 
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supervisors it required extrapolating data from three sources: the USFA census (noted above), the 
International City Managers Association’s (ICMA), and the NFPA.   
The second empirical data set used to extrapolate the estimated fire supervisor population 
originated from the International City Managers Association’s (ICMA) 2011 “Police and Fire 
Personnel, Salaries, and Expenditures” survey findings.  This annual survey queries cities for 
demographic information relating to their police and fire departments, which is then complied 
into a comprehensive report.  The 2011 report was sent to 3,286 cities with populations over 
9,999.  ICMA reported a response rate of 38% and noted that not all respondents answered every 
question; therefore, this response rate is based on those cities that answered the survey in its 
entirety. The survey indicated that 66% of the reporting fire departments have policies that 
specify a minimum staffing level required for a given type of apparatus.  According to ICMA’s 
findings, the average staffing level for the two dominant fire response apparatus (fire engines and 
ladder trucks) was three personnel.   
The last document used to estimate the population of fire service supervisors was the 
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard 1710 (Standard for the Organization and 
Deployment of Fire Suppression Operations, Emergency Medical Operations, and Special 
Operations to the Public by Career Fire Departments).  This standard recommends that all career 
fire departments minimally staff their fire engines and ladder trucks with one fire supervisor, a 
driver/operator and a basic level firefighter.  Using the data from the USFA census database and 
the ICMA survey combined with the NFPA recommended standards allowed the researcher to 
estimate the total population of fire department supervisors throughout the U.S.  
It is important to reiterate that the number derived from estimating the fire service 
supervisor population is not precise due to several limiting factors.  First, many fire agencies 
provide Advanced Life Support (ALS) service that require specially trained personnel who have a 
para-medicine certification (their specific title is paramedic).  Furthermore, these paramedics are 
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assigned to ambulance or rescue units, which normally are staffed with two personnel (either two 
paramedics or one paramedic and one firefighter).  Therefore, not all of the personnel listed in the 
USFA database are assigned to only an engine or ladder truck. 
A second obstacle for accurately gauging the number of fire service officers is the lack of 
information on the number of chief officers each agency employs.  This has the effect of 
underrepresenting these positions in estimating the total number of supervisors.   
Unfortunately, because the USFA database does not differentiate between agencies that 
provide ALS service (those with paramedics) and those that do not, this has the potential to 
overestimate the number of fire supervisors.  Conversely, the inability to capture the number of 
chief officers who are not assigned to front line apparatus (i.e., engines or ladder trucks) has the 
effect of underestimating the number of these types of fire supervisors. Unfortunately, there is no 
effective way to adjust for either of these deviations.  For this project, however, the estimates that 
are described in the following section was adequate for determining the sample size needed for 
statistically significant analysis.  The specific steps taken to estimate the sample population are 
detailed in following three paragraphs. 
The first step for calculating the fire supervisor sample population was to extract the total 
number of career fire departments from USFA’s 2012 census (1,819), which accounted for 
200,541 total sworn personnel including chief officers.    
Next, intuiting that each of the reporting departments has only one fire chief, this number 
(1,819) was subtracted from the total number of firefighters, which leaves a total of 198,722 fire 
response personnel who are either firefighters, engineers (apparatus driver/operators), 
paramedics, or fire officers.  
Then, based on the information gleaned from the ICMA 2012 survey the recommended 
NFPA 1710 or 1720 standards on staffing, yielded an estimated total fire supervisor population of 
68,060 (198,722 divided by three plus the 1,819 fire chiefs).   
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The researcher then utilized the formula below to determine the sample size using a 5% 
margin of error or precision level and a 95% confidence level.15 
𝑛 =
𝑁𝑧2 ∗  0.25
(𝑑2 ∗ [𝑁 − 1)] + (𝑧2 ∗ 0.25)
 
This yielded a total sample size of 382, which was subsequently approximated to 400.  
Unfortunately, the inability to access the population of randomly selected fire supervisors 
presented a structurally insurmountable obstacle.  Because no master contact list of fire 
supervisors is available from which to randomly select the sample population, it required 
assessment of various sampling alternatives – none of which were ideal.   
The first option explored entailed utilizing the serve lists of several trade organizations to 
send out notices to their respective members thus allowing respondents to self-select. This choice 
was deemed undesirable as it did not allow for a truly randomized selection and would have 
potentially skewed the data.   
The second alternative evaluated was even less feasible than the first. It would have 
required the researcher to directly contact a randomly selected group of fire departments and 
request access to their lists of personnel that would allowed for further randomization.  This 
approach was eliminated for two reasons: time and legal constraints.  The first issue, time, would 
have required an inordinate investment in time contacting 383 individual fire departments. The 
second, and more problematic issue, was related to legal constraints.  Fire agencies, as with most 
organizations, are reluctant to provide contact information of its members fearing legal 
repercussions.  These two obstacles quickly made this option unworkable.  
The choice, while not optimal, did allow for high level of randomization while being 
practical to accomplish than the first two options.  Utilizing this procedure, the researcher sent 
engagement letters to the fire chiefs of 400 fire departments randomly selected from the USFA 
                                                          
15 Where: n = minimum sample size; N = estimated population size; d = precision level (0.05); z = z value 
(1.96 for a 95% confidence level). 
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database.  Collectively these fire departments have 52,566 sworn personnel.  Interestingly, once 
this number was adjusted to reflect the total number of fire service supervisors in the sample 
population (17,789),16 the calculated sample size was roughly equal to that of the larger 
population (383).  The last challenge that became evident was still existed, however, and that was 
the issue of fire chiefs acting as gatekeepers for broader distribution to their respective 
supervisors. In order to achieve the statistically significant threshold of 400 responses, it was 
necessary to attain a 15% response rate, which is the norm in organizational research (Lievens, 
Schollaert and Choragwicka, 2010; Baruch and Holtom, 2008).   
Reliability and Validity 
The ultimate goal of a quantitative research project is to elicit data from which theory can 
be objectively tested and relationships between variables discerned (Cresswell, 2008). This 
necessitates a process for analyzing the data in a way that ensures reliability and validity.  This 
type of analysis is appropriate when several independent variables may influence one or more 
dependent variables (Cresswell, 2008; Leedy, 1993).  If the model is predictive as previous 
studies suggest, than the hypothesized relationships should materialize (Brownrigg-Innes, 2004; 
Ferris and Kacmar, 1992; Vigoda-Gadot, 2007).  Before we get to this point, however, it is first 
necessary to address the survey instrument’s validity and reliability and the basic assumptions 
necessary for selecting the appropriate statistical analysis tools (Forsberg, 2011). 
Reliability and Validity are important steps for authenticating analysis of quantitative 
research (Cresswell, 2008).  The following sections discuss how the researcher tested for validity 
and reliability. 
Reliability.  Reliability is the degree to which an assessment tool, in this case the survey 
instrument, produces stable and consistent results (Cresswell, 2008; Fink and Kosecoff, 1998; 
                                                          
16 The 17,789 was calculated by subtracting the 400 fire chiefs that head up those agencies from 52,566, 
which yields a remaining sample population of 52,166 that are firefighters, engineers (apparatus 
driver/operators), paramedics, or fire officers. This number was then divided by three and the 400 fire 
chiefs were added back in. 
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Leedy, 1993).  The measure of reliability used for this project was the Cronbach alpha coefficient.  
Results from a Cronbach alpha coefficient test ranges from zero to one.  Scores nearer to one 
have greater internal consistency of the survey items.   
George and Mallery (2003, p. 231) went further to provide rules of thumb that enable a 
researcher to more definitely gauge a survey’s reliability and graduate as follows: 
> 0.9 – Excellent 
> 0.8 – Good 
> 0.7 – Acceptable 
> 0.6 – Questionable 
> 0.5 – Poor 
< 0.5 – Unacceptable 
In previous studies, the POP scale has shown consistently strong reliability (Kacmar and 
Ferris, 1991 [α = 0.93]; Ferris , Frink, Bhawuk, Zhou, and Gilmore, 1996 [α = 0.90], and 
Andrews and Kacmar, 2001 [α = 0.87]). In this study, the 15-item POP scale measure alpha 
coefficient was 0.84, which was within the acceptable range of reliability and close to the scores 
previously reported.  Additionally, the PIP scale’s alpha coefficient was 0.76, which places the 
scale in the acceptable range, though not as high as had been hoped for yet still useful for this 
study.  While reliability is an important measure for ensuring the accuracy of a survey instrument, 
it is also necessary for it to be valid, which is addressed in the next section. 
Validity.  Measures of validity determine how well an instrument measures what it 
purports to measure (Cresswell, 2008).  In other words, are researchers measuring what they think 
they are measuring?  There are two dimensions of validity a researcher must consider: external 
and internal.  
External Validity.  External validity is achieved if the data is generalizable to a different 
or a larger population as well as over different time periods.  Tests for external validity examine 
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whether there is biased sampling; is a large enough sample size to properly represent the larger 
population; the survey is applicable for different populations; and, can produce similar results 
over time.     
Studies of organizational behavior rely on the accuracy of empirical data. Yet, 
quantitative studies in organizational behavior have been criticized for their measurement 
limitations (Donaldson and Grant-Vallone, 2002). One of the primary reasons for this critique is 
the field’s reliance on data collected from respondents who self-select. These types of data 
gathering instruments are common, because they are easy to use. They also allow for access to a 
large or remote population. However, they are also highly susceptible to response bias 
(Donaldson and Grant-Vallone, 2002; Leedy, 1993). Researchers, in turn, must be cognizant of 
bias that can affect survey results, which leads to data distortion. Leedy (1993) asserts it is 
“inexcusable” for a researcher to fail to address the potential for corruption of the data (p. 108). 
Cresswell (2008) advises using two techniques to detect the existence of data bias: wave analysis 
or a respondent-non-respondent check. The method most appropriate for this project, given the 
anonymity of respondents, is the use of wave analysis where returns were regularly examined for 
changes in average rates of return. Wave analysis gauges non-response bias by comparing those 
who respond with those who respond after follow-up measures are taken (Rainey, Pandey and 
Bozeman, 1995).  Ostensibly, if the responses appreciably change with follow-up this might 
indicate potential data bias. The second strategy is to contact a “few” non-respondents to 
determine if their responses differ substantially from respondents.  To address bias for this 
project, the researcher conducted wave analyses to find anomalies that suggested data corruption.   
The first entrée email was sent on February 21, 2014.  From that date to March 5th, 20 
respondents completed the survey. A second email was sent on March 6th and between that date 
and March 23rd, another 75 completed the survey.  A final reminder email was sent on March 24th 
and between then and March 31st the last 39 respondents completed the survey.  The summary 
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data from the three waves were virtually identical (reference Chapter IV for final results of the 
combined data sets).  This suggests there was no discernable bias in the responses.  
As importantly, a full accounting of the precise nature and extent of all bias that may 
have affected the research results were analyzed and none were discovered.  
Internal Validity.  Internal validity pertains to the legitimacy of the research variables 
and is categorized in a number of ways (e.g., content, criterion, construct, face, formative, and 
sampling).  The most relevant for this project is construct validity.    
Construct validity is the extent to which a survey instrument and its associated scales 
accurately evaluate what they are designed to measure.  Simply put, do the measures behave as 
the theory suggests they should?  Use of “experts” within the field and familiar with the construct 
is one method researchers can use to assess the construct validity of the instrument (Bleijenbergh, 
Korzilius, and Verschuren, 2011).  Select experts examine the survey questions and determine 
whether the specific questions measure what they were designed to assess. 
To address this issue, the researcher first relied on the input of eleven fire service experts 
with academic experience developing research designs to provide face validity of the survey 
instrument.  The experts took an early version of the survey instrument and provided feedback 
necessary for improving its quality for the full research project.  As might be expected, some of 
the feedback centered on grammatical or stylistic issues (e.g., spelling, spacing between 
paragraphs, use of specific words, etc.).  The substantive comments, however, were most useful 
for improving the survey instrument.   
The most consistent comment centered on confusion over the term Bureaucratic Politics.  
All of the respondents felt the term was either ambiguous or imprecisely used as it combined two 
different concepts – politics and bureaucracy.  Furthermore, they felt the term was not uniformly 
applied as the individual questions only referenced politics and not bureaucratic politics as had 
been articulated early in the survey. 
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As stated previously, bureaucratic politics, as defined by political scientists, has a precise 
meaning.  It was evident the survey’s introduction should explain “politics” in a general context, 
which seems to align with most respondents’ awareness of the term from their training, education, 
or experience.    
A second issue raised by respondents involved Section I, questions 33–40.  Several 
respondents felt the early likert scale did not accurately represent the range of actions an interest 
group might take.  Specifically, they suggested that an interest group might not be content to 
simply be unhelpful, but could actively undermine a specific management task.  This was an 
astute point and one that could, if left unchanged, alter the survey results. Consequently, this 
section of survey now uses a likert range of “No Impact” to “Extreme Impact” (Appendix).  
The last critique offered was the need to analyze the specific activities for each 
management function so they are appropriately categorized.  For example, the early survey 
instrument operationalized social capital as either a positive or a negative force.  Consequently, 
respondents interpreted this question differently, which scored the influence of politics on this 
management task either positive or negative.  The researcher altered the wording so respondents 
only assessed it as the positive creation of social capital. 
Ethical Considerations and Action Steps 
 Coghlan and Brannick summarize the ethical imperative related to the use of human 
subjects in research, "...ethics are taken to refer to not doing harm, not breaching confidentiality 
not distorting the data..."  (2005, p. 77).  It is clear researchers have an exceptionally high ethical 
responsibility toward their subjects, even those who complete surveys.  This is necessary so 
respondents are treated with respect, humanly, and in a manner that it does not violate their 
inherent rights.  Lofland, Snow, Anderson, and Lofland (2006) suggest two fundamental 
questions need to be contemplated by researchers in order to ascertain whether potential ethical 
issues might exist.  
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 First, the researcher must ask “should this group be studied at all?” (Trull, 2004, p. 107) 
Next, “should I be the one to study this group?” (Leicester and Taylor, 1992, p. 194) 
 Addressing the first question, this group provides important information that may help 
future researchers and practitioners develop effective strategies to manage these frequently 
disruptive forces.  Supervisors, in particular, are potentially in the most advantageous position to 
moderate these pressures so that an organization can achieve its core mission.  In determining the 
efficacy of utilizing surveys as a data gathering tool a researcher must also pay particular 
attention to whether the subjects belong to a disenfranchised or oppressed group, which includes 
minors, women, the incarcerated, and the disabled. It has been determined the individual 
members of this group do not belong to a disadvantaged or oppressed group.  It should be noted, 
that while these groups are the most obvious, the researcher remained cognizant of others that 
might have surfaced that were not apparent to the researcher but are, nonetheless, vulnerable.  To 
address this issue, the researcher constructed the survey instrument so that no identifying 
information was collected that would classify respondents as one of the identified disenfranchised 
or oppressed groups.   Therefore, no special provisions were made to address this potential ethical 
issue.   
  Addressing the second issue, there were no identified problems that precluded the 
researcher from studying this population as described in the research overview.  Moreover, there 
were no conflicts of interests including financial or other personal gains identified through the 
IRB process or by the researcher's faculty advisor. 
Ethical Mitigation Action Steps 
 The following mitigation strategies were used to address the ethical considerations outlined 
above:  
 Confidentiality – No information collected identified the survey taker as they 
remained anonymous throughout the process.  
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 Data Security – the following measures were used to ensure confidentiality of the 
data obtained from the surveys:  
 Data Storage – all survey data is stored in two password encrypted protected hard 
drives on the principal researcher's personal computer located at his home 
residence.  
 The researcher's personal computer and the associated hard drives are only 
accessible to the principal researcher.    
 This data will be kept for five years after publication. If no inquiries are made 
requesting specific information about the data it will be deleted from the hard 
drives.  
 The data will be reported as part of the principal researcher's dissertation 
requirements and an academic journal as an article.   
There are no foreseeable risks to maintaining confidentiality as the completed surveys 
and all related data is only be accessible to the research author and reported as a summary in the 
final dissertation paper.  The records from this study will be kept private.   
These procedures were reviewed and approved through Oklahoma State University’s 
Institutional Review Board (IRB).
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
FINDINGS 
 
 
 
This chapter presents the results of the statistical analysis of the data collected from the 
survey instrument.  A link to the survey was e-mailed to 400 fire chiefs throughout the U.S. who 
collectively manage a total of 52,566 career line personnel.  As discussed in the Sample 
Population section, extrapolation yielded an estimated 17,789 fire supervisors from these 400 fire 
agencies needed to generalize the results to the population of all fire service supervisors (68,060).  
Unfortunately, of the 400 entrée emails sent containing the survey instrument link, 177 surveys 
were initiated but only 134 respondents completed the survey.  This represents less than a 1% 
response rate of the estimated 17,789 supervisors within those 400 fire agencies.  The response 
rate for fire chiefs was much higher at 19.25%.  While the response rate does not allowing for 
generalization to the larger population, it does increase the probability that the findings more 
accurately reflect those of the larger population (Baruch and Holtom, 2008).  Despite the small 
sample size amongst fire supervisors, other than fire chiefs, analysis of the data yielded some 
interesting findings that will be instructive for future research.  The succeeding paragraphs details 
the summary results, testing of assumptions, and presents the statistical results testing the five 
research hypotheses. 
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Summary Results 
Before the more in-depth discussion of the summary data is presented, it is informative to 
first examine the demographic information of the 134 respondents (Table 3).   
Most respondents indicated having an undergraduate or graduate degree (85 total or 63% 
of all respondents).  An overwhelming number are employed in a city fire department. Finally, of 
the 134 surveys returned, fire chiefs completed 77 surveys (or nearly 58% of all respondents).  
This suggests fire chiefs either withheld the survey for wider distribution to his or her supervisors, 
or, if distributed, there was not enough interest to warrant a higher response rate for those below 
the rank of fire chief.   
Category No. of Respondents 
Education  
 High School (8th -12th Grades) 4 
 Some College or an Associate’s Degree 45 
 Undergraduate Degree 51 
 Graduate Degree (Masters, PhD, JD) 34 
Employees  
 Fewer than 50 32 
 50-99 32 
 More than 99 70 
Governance Type  
 Special District 10 
 County 9 
 City 112 
 Other 3 
Population  
 Less than 50,000 44 
 50,000-149,999 43 
 150,000 – 299,999 34 
 300,000 – 449,999 7 
 450,000 or more 6 
Rank  
 Other 1 
 Lieutenant 8 
 Captain 28 
 Battalion Chief 11 
 Deputy Chief 5 
 Assistant Chief 4 
 Fire Chief 77 
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Table 3: Unaltered/Raw demographic data 
Category No. of Respondents 
Organizational Level  
 Six or More Levels Down from Fire Chief 1 
 Five Levels Down from Fire Chief 8 
 Four Levels Down from Fire Chief 18 
 Three Levels Down from Fire Chief 9 
 Two Levels Down from Fire Chief 8 
 One Level Down from Fire Chief 12 
 Top Level (Fire Chief) 78 
Table 3 (cont.): Unaltered/Raw demographic data 
To achieve more statistically relevant information using the demographic information, it 
necessitated collapsing several sub-categories into broader subsets (Table 4).  For instance, since 
so few respondents held a high school level of education, this sub-category was merged with 
those respondents that had “Some College or an Associate’s Degree.”   Similarly, in the category 
of “Organizational Level” it was necessary to reduce from six to three sub-categories: “Top Level 
(Fire Chief),” “One to Three Levels Down from Fire Chief Four,” or “More Levels Down from 
Fire Chief.”  
Category No. of Respondents 
Education  
 HS or Some College or Assoc. Degree 49 
 Undergraduate Degree 50 
 Graduate Degree (Masters, PhD, JD) 34 
Number of Employees  
 Fewer than 50 32 
 50-99 31 
 More than 99 70 
Governance Type  
 Other than City  21 
 City 112 
Population  
 Less than 50,000 47 
 50,000-149,999 43 
 Over 150,000 43 
Table 4: Collapsed demographic data  
 
 
 
 
83 
 
 
Category No. of Respondents 
Rank  
 Company Officer 36 
 Chief Officer other than Fire Chief 20 
 Fire Chief 77 
Organizational Level  
 Four or More Levels Down from Fire Chief 27 
 One to Three Levels Down from Fire Chief 28 
 Top Level (Fire Chief) 78 
Table 4 (cont.): Unaltered/Raw demographic data 
The summary results provide some fascinating findings, the first of which are the median 
values for both POP and PIP (39.0 and 55.0 respectively) as the survey average for both score is 
30. This is an early indication that most respondents perceive both forms of politics existing 
within and external to their respective agencies.   
       
Perceptions of Organizational  
Politics 
(POP) 
Perceptions of Institutional 
Politics 
(PIP) 
Survey Scale  
(Min-Max)  
15-75 15-75 
Survey Scale Average  30 30 
Minimum 18.0 33.0 
1st Quarter 34.0 51.0 
Median 39.0 55.0 
3rd Quarter 43.0 61.0 
Maximum 60.0 71.0 
Standard Deviation ±10.135 ±8.153 
Table 5: Summary Data – Perceptions of Organizational and Institutional Politics 
What the data does not indicate is the perceived impact these two phenomena have on 
management activities, which is more apparent in Table 6.  It is clear from the summary data that 
respondents perceived internal politics as influencing strategic planning (SPI) and social capital 
(SPI), which all having median and mean values much higher than each task’s survey scale 
average (Table 6).  To illustrate, SPI has a median value of 10.0. Yet, the task’s survey scale 
average is 6.0.  
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Strategic 
Planning 
Internal 
(SPI) 
Budgeting 
Internal 
(BI) 
Personnel Mgt. 
Internal 
(PI) 
Social Capital 
Internal 
(SCI) 
Survey Scale  
(Min-Max)  
3-15 3-15 3-15 3-15 
Survey Scale Average  6 6 6 6 
Minimum 3.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 
1st Quarter 8.0 7.0 6.0 9.0 
Median 10.0 8.0 8.0 11.0 
3rd Quarter 11.0 10.0 9.0 13.0 
Maximum 15.0 15.0 13.0 15.0 
Standard Deviation ± 2.284 ± 2.419 ± 2.390 ± 2.574 
    Table 6: Summary Data – Perceived Impact of Organizational Politics on Management Tasks 
Finally, the median and mean scores for the perceived external influencers on Strategic 
Planning (SPE), Budgeting (BE) and Social Capital (SCE) all had median and mean scores 
significantly high then the average of the survey scale (Table 7).   
 
Strategic 
Planning 
External 
(SPE) 
Budgeting 
External 
(BE) 
Personnel Mgt. 
External 
(PE) 
Social Capital 
External 
(SCE) 
Survey Scale  
(Min-Max)  
3-15 
3-15 3-15 3-15 
Survey Scale Average  6 6 6 6 
Minimum 3.0 4.0 3.0 3.0 
1st Quarter 7.0 7.0 4.0 8.0 
Median 9.0 9.0 5.0 10.0 
3rd Quarter 10.0 10.0 7.0 12.0 
Maximum 14.0 15.0 13.0 15.0 
Standard Deviation ±2.286 ±1.951 ±2.118 ±2.462 
Table 7: Summary Data – Perceived Impact of Institutional Politics on Management Tasks 
Correlations 
Another useful analysis is examining correlations that exist between independent and 
dependent variables.  Unlike the median and mean analysis, the only correlation that exists is a 
negative one: between POP and the internal groups that influence Strategic Planning (SPI) (Table 
8).  That is to say, as respondents’ perceptions of organizational politics increase, there is a 
corresponding decrease in their perceptions that internal groups influence strategic planning.  
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This runs contrary to the literature and hypotheses advanced earlier but are examined in more 
depth in Chapter V.   
 POP PIP 
Strategic Planning - External Influencers (SPE) --- 0.016 
Strategic Planning - Internal Influencers (SPI) -0.51 --- 
Budgeting - External Influencers (BE) --- 0.090 
Budgeting - Internal Influencers (BI) -0.220 --- 
Personnel Management - External Influencers (PE) --- -0.025 
Personnel Management - Internal Influencers (PI) -0.067 --- 
Social Capital - External Influencers (SCE) --- -0.136 
Social Capital - Internal Influencers (SCI) -0.332 --- 
Governance (GOV) -0.069 0.034 
Employees (EMP) 0.086 0.115 
Population (POPUL) 0.091 0.203 
Rank (RNK) -0.167 0.079 
Org Level (OL) -0.400 -0.119 
Education (EDU) -0.021 -0.048 
Table 8: All Correlation between Management Tasks POP and PIP Scales 
Testing Assumptions 
Prior to testing the hypotheses, it is first necessary to test the various assumptions needed 
to determine the appropriate statistical procedure to apply (Forsberg, 2011). These assumptions 
include normality and variability of the dependent variables and multicollinearity of the 
independent variables.   
Testing for Normality.  The first assumption that must be examined is the normality of 
the dependent variables. Assessing the normality of data is an important step for assessing the 
statistical strength of the results and their generalizability to the larger population.  Moreover, the 
results of normality tests allow for the selection of the appropriate test given the nature of the data 
(Forsberg, 2011). There are two primary methods for assessing normality: graphical and 
statistical.  
The first approach for assessing normality is to visually evaluate the data using the most 
common graphical tool: Quantile-Quantile (Q-Q) plots.  If the data are normally distributed, the 
data points closely align with the diagonal line. If data points systematically drift from the line it 
may indicate the data are not normally distributed.  
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The graphical tests for the dependent variables (Management activities and POP and PIP) 
are represented in Figures 5, 6 and 7.  Figure 5 and 6 present the Q-Q plots for each of the four 
management activities as respondents perceived them to have been impacted by internal and 
external influencers. Similarly, the Q-Q plots for POP and PIP (Figure 7) do not indicate any 
systematic deviation along the diagonal line. Although none of the Q-Q plots indicate perfect 
normality of the variables, there does not appear to be any orderly deviation from the diagonal 
line. However, it required the use of a statistical test to validate the visual assumptions. 
 
Figure 5: Quantile-Quantile plots of the internal influencers on the four 
management functions.  
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Figure 6: Quantile-Quantile plots of the external influencers on the 
four management functions.  
 
Figure 7: Quantile-Quantile plots of POP and PIP. 
Statistical testing for normality uses the null hypothesis (H0) that the randomly selected 
sample data has a normal distribution.  Therefore, statistical tests center on the symmetry of the 
distribution.  While numerous tests are available, the most commonly used is the Shapiro-Wilk, 
because of its statistical power and its tendency to be less sensitive to outliers compared to other 
tests (Forsberg, 2011) 
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For this project, the researcher elected to use an alpha level (α) equal to 0.05 and a null 
hypothesis that the data are normally distributed (i.e., H0 is rejected when p-values are less than α 
=0.05).  Conversely, if the p-value is greater than 0.05, then the null hypothesis is not rejected; 
hence, the data is normally distributed.  When the Shapiro-Wilk test was applied to all the 
dependent variables, the results showed all were not normally distributed (Table 8). 
When multiple hypothesis tests are performed on a single data set there is an increased 
chance of obtaining false-positive results (Type I errors).  Put more simply, there is an increased 
probability of identifying at least one significant result due as more hypotheses are tested 
(Forsberg, 2011).  To adjust for this problem, an adjustment using the Bonferroni correction 
procedure can be used.   
The Bonferroni correction procedure is predicated on the premise that if a researcher tests 
n dependent or independent hypotheses on a set of data, the probability of Type I error is offset 
by testing each hypothesis at a statistical significance level 1/n.  To perform a Bonferroni 
correction, divide the selected p-value by the number of comparisons being made. For instance, if 
ten hypotheses are tested, the original p-value threshold (in political and social sciences the p-
value most frequently selected is α = 0.05 [Johnson , 2013; Gill, 1999]) is divided by ten (new p-
value = 0.05/10 = 0.005).  Then, the resultant p-values are evaluated against the new p-value (α = 
0.005) accepting or rejecting the null hypothesis. 
Once the Bonferroni correction procedure was applied, it indicated that only two of eight 
variables groups are sufficiently non-Normal to cause concern (comparing the p-values to α = 
0.006) (Table 9).17  Conversely, both POP and PIP variables are non-Gaussian, which required 
the use of non-parametric statistical tests.  
 
                                                          
17 The eight variables were derived from measuring the impact of politics by both internal and external 
groups on each management task. 
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 W P-Value 
Normally Distributed 
Uncorrected 
(α=0.05) 
Normally Distributed 
Corrected 
(α=0.006) 
SPI  0.978  0.029 NO YES 
BI  0.976  0.017 NO YES 
PI  0.973 0.009 NO YES 
SCI  0.962  0.001 NO NO 
SPE  0.979  0.033 NO YES 
BE  0.972  0.007 NO YES 
PE  0.926  
1.665x 10-
6 NO NO 
SCE  0.978  0.027 NO YES 
 
W P-Value 
Normally Distributed 
Uncorrected 
(α=0.05) 
Normally Distributed 
Corrected 
(α=0.025) 
POP  0.951  0.001 NO NO 
PIP 0.971 0.006 NO NO 
Table 9: Shapiro-Wilk test results using uncorrected and Bonferroni corrected p-values  
These findings inform the decision as to which statistical method to use when testing the 
hypotheses, which is discussed in more detail in the Testing the Hypotheses section.   
Testing for Equal-Variance.  The second assumption in need of testing is that of equal 
variances across the dependent variables. As with the Normality tests, there are both graphical 
and numerical tests. The graphical test of choice is the boxplot (Figures 8, 9 and 10). 
The boxplots in Figure 8 and 9 indicate the variances between the internal and external 
management functions relative to one another.  Despite the appearance of relative symmetry, 
several functions (SPI, BI, BE, and PE) have at least one outlier, which could indicate an 
abnormal distribution, as well as unequal variances. A numerical test, Fligner-Killeen, was used 
to identify the variables that violated the equal-variance assumption.  
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Figure 8: The boxplots of the perceived internal influencers on the four 
management functions: strategic planning, budgeting, personal 
management, and social capital.  
 
Figure 9: The boxplots of the perceived external influencers on the 
four management functions: strategic planning, budgeting, 
personal management, and social capital. 
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Figure 10: The boxplots of the perceptions of Organizational and 
Institutional Politics. 
Running the Fligner-Killeen test, there was only one variable that failed to produce p-
values less than the selected alpha value (0.05). That was internal influences on building social 
capital (SCI) given rank and file (RKFL) (X2 =13.351, df = 4, p-value = 0.01). However, using 
the Bonferroni correction procedure at the new p-value (α = 0.013) the null hypothesis (the 
dependent variables have equal variables) was not rejected for any of the variables. 
Testing for Multicollinearity.  The last set of tests examines the independence of each 
independent variable from the other.  Table 9 provides more detailed examinations of the 
correlations between the demographic, POP and PIP variables.  There were high correlations 
between Population (POPUL) and Number of employees (EMP) (0.792) and Population 
(POPUL) and Organizational Levels (OL) (-0.614). A Pearson's product-moment correlation test 
was used to verify the statistical significance of these correlations and verified their existence 
(Population Served and Number of Employees, t = 14.945, p = 2.2e-16 and Population Served 
and Organizational Level, t = -8.993, p = 3.166e-15).  Intuitively, this makes sense.  As 
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populations grow, public sector organizations typically expand to accommodate increasing 
demands for service.  In turn, as organizations grow they adapt their structures to effectively 
manage the increase service requirements and added personnel (Lipsky, 2010, p. 92; Ladd, 1992).  
What is counterintuitive, and contrary to the literature, is the negative correlation between 
population and organization level.  None of the literature review indicates why this result was 
produced and future research will have to address this incongruity.  For this research project, 
however, it did not raise enough concern to delete the variables from analysis.  
Independent 
Variables GOV EMP POPUL RNK OL PIP 
Governance 
(GOV) --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Employees 
(EMP) -0.043 --- --- --- --- --- 
Population 
(POPUL) -0.110 0.792 --- --- --- --- 
Rank 
(RNK) 0.031 -0.101 -0.138 --- --- --- 
 Org Level 
(OL) -0.167 -0.447 -0.614 0.18 --- --- 
Education 
(EDU) -0.245 -0.252 -0.345 0.017 0.476 --- 
POP  --- --- --- --- --- -0.28 
Table 10: Correlations between independent variables 
Testing the Hypotheses 
Despite the correlations, it is necessary to examine the hypotheses using more robust 
statistical tests so that more meaningful findings can be extracted from the analyses – specifically 
do any of the independent variable have predictive values (Forsberg, 2011)?  Unfortunately, there 
are no universal procedures that can be applied to test all the hypotheses as the dependent and 
independent variables dictate which statistical techniques are appropriate.  
Because the POP and PIP dependent variables are not normally distributed and the 
demographic independent variables are ordinal or categorical, it requires the use of a non-
parametric statistical test to establish the relationships between the variables (Forsberg, 2011; 
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McDonald, 2009 ).  As such, the Kruskal–Wallis procedure, a non-parametric method for testing 
whether samples originate from the same distribution (Kruskal and Wallis, 1952; Corder and 
Foreman, 2009), was used to test first three hypotheses.   
The Kruskal–Wallis tests whether the mean ranks are the same in all the groups. 
Therefore, if the Kruskal–Wallis test yields a p-value less than 0.05, then a potential relationship 
may exist between variables as the sample population means are not equal. It is important to note, 
however, the results do not identify the predictive nature of the variables nor how they rank 
amongst one another.    
The first hypothesis tested (H1) using the Kruskal-Wallis rank sum procedure was: the 
lower the rank, the more respondents will perceive organizational politics (POP) to exist.  The 
results suggest there is a statistically significant relationship between POP and Rank (Chi-squared 
= 23.073, df= 2, p-value=9.77x 10-6).  That is, a lower rank corresponds to a greater tendency that 
a respondent perceives the existence of organizational politics (Figure 11).  Similarly, despite 
there being no statistically significant relationship between organizational level and POP (Chi-
squared = 2.0368, df= 1, p-value=0.154), the graph indicates there may be a relationship between 
organizational level and POP.  That is, the lower the organizational level a respondent resides, the 
more likely he or she will perceive organizational politics to exist (Figure 12).    
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Figure 11: Graph demonstrating the relationship between rank and 
POP using the Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test.  
 
Figure 12: Graph demonstrating the relationship between 
organizational level and POP using the Kruskal-Wallis rank sum 
test.  
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The second hypothesis (H2) tested using the Kruskal-Wallis procedure was: respondents 
whose fire agencies have more personnel (both operational and staff) will perceive higher levels 
of organizational politics (POP). The results from the test suggest there is no statistically 
significant relationship between number of employees and respondents’ perceptions of increased 
organizational politics (Chi-squared = 1.9346, df= 2, p-value=0.380).  The graph makes this 
finding more evident (Figure 13) as it shows no consistent relationship between the variables.   
 
Figure 13: Graph demonstrating the relationship between number of 
employees and POP using the Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test.  
The last hypothesis (H3) tested using the Kruskal-Wallis procedure was: the higher the 
rank, the more they perceive the existence of institutional politics (PIP).  Unlike the affirmative 
findings between POP and rank, there does not appear to be a similar relationship between 
institutional politics (PIP) and rank (Chi-squared = 1.564, df= 2, p-value=0.458) (Figures 14) nor 
PIP and organizational level (Chi-squared = 0.4379, df= 1, p-value=0.508).  However, graphing 
the relationship for PIP given organizational level suggests a relationship may exist (Figure 15).  
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Figure 14: Graph demonstrating the relationship between rank and PIP 
using the Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test.  
 
Figure 15: Graph demonstrating the relationship between 
organizational level and PIP using the Kruskal-Wallis rank sum 
test. 
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The last two hypotheses tested examine the influence bureaucratic politics have on 
management functions, which are both bounded above and below.  This required manually 
transforming the dependent variables to proportions that yielded scores between 0 and 1.  This 
transformation process is necessary because when predicting dependent variables that are 
bounded, it invariably leads to implausible predictions (Forsberg, 2011).  He states that to 
improve the model, it requires converting the “boundedness” of the variables using three steps (p. 
146):   
1. Transform the dependent variable from a restricted range to an unrestricted 
range.  
2. Second, perform the analysis on this transformed variable.  
3. Back-transform the results into the original units. The logit function 
transforms variables bounded by 0 and 1 into unbounded variables. 
While other transform processes are available, the logit function is most frequently used 
for the following reasons (Forsberg, 2011, p. 148): 
1. The transformation and its inverse are both functions (the transform is a 
bijective function). This means that the results are always commensurate to 
the original problem. 
2. The transformation is symmetric. This means that the ‘stretching’ is the same 
for values near 0 as they are for values near 1. 
3. The function is exact, as opposed to the probit transform which requires 
numerical approximations. This increases the speed and accuracy of your 
predictions. 
As noted previously, once the Bonferroni correction procedure was applied to all four 
management activities (for both internal and external influencer groups) it indicated that only two 
of the eight variables have abnormal distributions to cause concern (Table 9 on page 89).  
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Consequently, regression analysis is still appropriate to use as the two non-Gaussian variables 
will not skew the data enough to invalidate the results for the other variables.     
The first of these two hypotheses tested, H4: the more respondents perceive the existence 
of organizational politics they will also perceive the phenomenon affecting one or more 
management functions.  Because the dependent variables, management activities, are Gaussian 
this allowed for the use of regression analysis.  As such, four separate tests were conducted to 
examine the impact POP has on each management task (strategic planning, personnel 
management, budgeting and social capital).  The results were revealing, albeit, contrary to what 
the literature indicated the relationships would be.   
Of the four management activities, all but one (personnel management: t = -0.773, p-
value = 0.441) showed statistical significance.  However, what was unexpected is that these 
relationships were negative and significant.  For instance, there was a statistically significant 
negative relationship between POP and strategic planning indicating that as respondents 
perceived increased levels of organizational politics, there was a corresponding decrease in their 
perceptions that the phenomenon influences strategic planning (t=-3.921, p-value= 0.001). 
Likewise, POP appears to have a casually negative impact on both budgeting and building social 
capital (t=-2.228, p-value= 0.028 and t=-2.457, p-value= 0.015, respectively).  The graphs 
showing the relationships of these three variables, relative to POP, are shown in Figures 16-18.  
The results suggest that hypothesis H4 is valid given the sampled population. 
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Figure 16: Regression analysis graph showing impact of POP on 
strategic planning.18 
 
                                                          
18 The grey regions surrounding the Loess Curves represent the 95% confidence bands, which enclose the 
area that establishes the area contains 95% of the true curve. It also gives a visual representation of how 
well the data best fits the curve. It is also closely related to the 95% prediction bands, which enclose the 
area that 95% of future data points will fall. 
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Figure 17: Regression analysis graph showing impact of POP on 
budgeting. 
 
Figure 18: Regression analysis graph showing the impact POP has on 
building social capital. 
As with Hypothesis 4 (H4), regression analysis was used to test Hypothesis 5 (H5): the 
more respondents perceive the existence of institutional politics they will also perceive the 
phenomenon affecting one or more management functions.  The results did not demonstrate any 
statistically significant results that would indicate respondents perceive institutional politics 
affecting any management activities.  The statistical results are as follows:   
 SPE~PIP (t = 0.247, p-value = 0.805) 
 BE~PIP   (t = -0.661, p-value = 0.51) 
 PE~PIP   (t = -0.068, p-value = 0.946) 
 SCE~PIP (t = 1.380, p-value = 0.17) 
 
 
 
101 
 
Additional Inferences 
While the results for POP and PIP and their impact on management activities were either 
mixed or did not show any statistically significant relationships, the survey data collected allowed 
for additional statistical analysis that helped answer several research questions.   
Through manual manipulation of the data, the researcher was able to aggregate 
respondents’ perceptions of the impact each influencer group (Chief Officers, Rank and File 
personnel, Other Internal Stakeholders, Local Elected Officials, Unions, and Local Business 
Groups) has organizational and institutional politics.  This was accomplished by aggregating the 
individual scores for each group from questions five through eight and running regression 
analysis using POP and PIP as the dependent variables.  For instance, aggregating the survey 
responses from questions 5a, 6a, 7a and 8a yielded the impact respondents felt local politicians 
have on all four management activities cumulatively. Running generalized regression analysis 
produced results indicating that a statistically significant and negative relationship exists between 
respondents’ perceptions of Chief Officers’ impact on all management activities and POP.  That 
is, as respondents perceive the influence of Chief Officers to increase (specifically with respect to 
management activities), their perceptions of organizational politics correspondingly decreased    
(t = -4.457, p-value = 1.76 x 10-5).  This runs counter to the literature, which would have 
predicted the contrary relationship.  Similar findings were discovered for the other two influencer 
groups: 
 POP ~ rank and file personnel  (t = -5.292, p-value = 4.9 x 10-7) 
 POP ~ internal stakeholders (t = -2.126, p-value =0.044) 
Graphically, these three relationships are shown below (Figures 19-21). 
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Figure 19: Regression analysis graph showing the impact Chief 
Officers have on POP. 
 
 
Figure 20: Regression analysis graph showing the impact Rank and 
File has on POP. 
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Figure 21: Regression analysis graph showing the impact Internal 
Stakeholders have on POP. 
Interestingly, there is also a statistically significant and positive relationship between 
POP and Local Elected Officials (t = 2.098, p-value =0.038).  To be exact, as respondents 
perceived local elected officials influence on management activities to increase they 
correspondingly perceived higher levels of POP (Figure 22).  This was an unexpected finding as 
the literature suggested this would affect perceptions of institutional politics rather than POP.   
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Figure 22: Regression analysis graph showing the impact Elected 
Officials (Politicians) have on POP. 
Regression analysis showed a similar statistically significant and negative relationship 
between PIP and Politicians (t = -2.095, p=0.038) (Figure 23).   Regression analysis did not find 
any statistically significant relationships with respect to Unions and Business Groups (t = -0.867, 
p= 0.387 and t = 1.689, p = 0.062 respectively).  With that said, the influence of Business Groups 
and PIP was just outside the statistical threshold of α = 0.05 suggesting a positive relationship 
may exist.  
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Figure 23: Regression analysis graph showing the impact Elected 
Officials (Politicians) have on PIP. 
The last set of findings, not associated with testing one of the five hypotheses, relates to 
demographics’ influence on POP and PIP. As Table 11 illustrates, in addition to those noted 
previously for Rank and Organizational Level, there were statistically significant relationships 
between POP and population served (Chi-squared = 8.800, df= 2, p-value = 0.012) and level of 
education (Chi-squared = 6.196, df= 2, p-value = 0.045).  More precisely, the lower the 
educational level, the more respondents perceived the existence of organizational politics.  The 
graphs depicting these relationships (Figures 23 and 24, respectively), were mixed in supporting 
the statistical findings.  Figure 23 does not demonstrate a linear relationship between population 
and higher levels of POP.  Conversely, Figure 24 shows a strong linear trend between education 
level and POP.     
Perhaps one of the more compelling findings, despite its marginal statistical significance, 
is the relationship between PIP and population served (Chi-squared = 5.064, df= 2, p-
value=0.08).  As the Figure 14 shows, as the population served increases, there is a corresponding 
 
 
 
106 
 
increase in PIP.  This suggests, at least with this sample population, respondents perceived the 
existence of external politics more frequently as the population they service increases.  This 
compliments the regression finding that a possible positive linear relationship may exist between 
business groups’ influence and increased levels of PIP.   These findings support the notion that 
institutional politics are perceptually real.  Moreover, while just outside the statistically 
significant range, the more active business groups are the greater the possibility they increase an 
organization’s level PIP.  What is not as evident is how business groups affect organizational 
outcomes as they did not have any discernable influence on management activities.  
 Chi-Squared 
Degrees of 
Freedom (df) P-Value Relationship 
PIP     
 Employees (EMP) 3.335 2 0.189 No 
 Education (EDU) 0.202 2 0.904 No 
 Org Level (OL) 1.564 2 0.458 No 
 Rank (RNK) 2.695 2 0.260 No 
 Population (POPUL) 5.064 2 0.080 No 
 Governance (GOV) 0.395 1 0.530 No 
POP     
 Employees (EMP) 1.935 2 0.380 No 
 Education (EDU) 6.196 2 0.045 Yes 
 Org Level (OL) 23.073 2 9.77 x 10-6 Yes 
 Rank (RNK) 24.674 2 4.386 x 10-6 Yes 
 Population (POPUL) 8.800 2 0.012 Yes 
 Governance (GOV) 0.499 1 0.480 No 
Table 11: Kruskal-Wallis test results of the means for demographics relative to POP and PIP. 
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Figure 24: Graph demonstrating the relationship between level of 
education and POP using the Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test. 
 
Figure 25: Graph demonstrating the relationship between levels within 
an organizational and POP using the Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test. 
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Figure 26: Graph demonstrating the relationship between rank and 
POP using the Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test. 
 
Figure 27: Graph demonstrating the relationship between population 
served and POP using the Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test. 
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As we close out this chapter, two salient questions remain unanswered and is outside the 
scope of this project, how do these groups affect organizational outcomes and is their influence 
necessarily negative?  Despite this research projects inability to answer these questions as 
completely as we had hoped, the next section, Chapter V, expands on the findings detailed above. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
The primary purpose of this quantitative, non-experimental research project was to 
conduct a scientific inquiry into the perceived existence and effects of bureaucratic politics.  It is 
anticipated these findings will better inform our understanding of the internal and external 
political pressures fire service managers encounter and how they perceive them to affect specific 
management activities.  
While little research has been devoted to examining the phenomena within public sector 
organizations, it is especially scarce with respect to fire service agencies.  As noted earlier, one of 
the few studies that centers on fire service organizations was conducted by Charles Phillips 
(2004). His research narrowly focused on executive-level fire service administrators (fire chiefs) 
and their perceptions of organizational politics.  The primary benefits of Phillips’s (2004) study 
are the findings provided an initial insight into the relationship between internal politics and fire 
chiefs.  
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This project builds on Phillips’s (2004) research but expands the scope in five distinct 
ways as it: 
1. Included fire service supervisors from lieutenant through fire chief;  
2. Examined both types of politics – organizational and institutional;    
3. Comprised departments of various sizes and types (e.g., city, county, special district); 
4. Encompassed respondents from non- metropolitan departments.  
It is expected the findings from this research project will, in turn, enable fire service 
leaders to develop techniques and strategy to capitalize on the positive effects or combat their 
subversive tendencies.  
This final chapter reviews the research questions and restates the results of the 
hypotheses tests; examines the findings; discusses the implications of the research; describes the 
studies limitations; and, provides recommendations for future research.  
Restatement of Research Questions and Hypotheses 
The purpose and approach of this research was designed to align with previous research 
that examined the perceived existence and impact of internal and external politics.  Most of these 
studies, however, primarily centered on one dimension or the other, which are more precisely 
defined as organizational (internal) or institutional (external). This study, by contrast, examined 
the phenomenon from both dimensional perspectives, which, as noted in the Literature Review 
section, is more broadly categorized as Bureaucratic Politics.  This expanded examination is 
necessary as organizations are influenced by both political variants (Kacmar and Baron, 1999; 
DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).   Finally, continuity between this study and prior research is found 
in the linkage between organizational politics and critical organizational outcomes. Specifically, 
it links to such outcomes as job involvement (Ferris , Russ, and Fandt, 1989; Witt, 1995) and 
organizational commitment (Maslyn and Fedor, 1998; Witt, Patti, and Farmer, 2002).  DiMaggio 
and Powell (1983) underscored the importance of this expanded focus, as all levels of an 
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organization are influenced by politics.  The disruptive nature of these forces necessitates 
developing management techniques to mitigate their detrimental effects.  As such, the underlying 
research questions for this study were: 
1. To what extent do fire service personnel perceive the existence of institutional and 
organizational politics? 
2. When respondents perceive one or both dimensions of bureaucratic politics 
(organizational and institutional), how do the phenomena affect their ability to 
execute core management functions? 
3. At what supervisory level or classification within fire organizations do supervisors 
perceive one or both dimensions of bureaucratic politics (organizational and 
institutional)?  
4. What additional individual and fire department demographic characteristics affect the 
perceived existence and impact on management activities for one or both forms of 
bureaucratic politics (organizational and institutional)? 
These questions served as the basis for operationalizing and measuring the concepts of 
organizational and institutional politics and their perceived influence on management activities, 
which allowed for testing of the following five hypotheses:  
 H1: The lower the rank s, the more respondents will perceive organizational politics 
(POP).  
The Kruskal-Wallis test results supports this hypothesis; however, it’s important to 
clarify this test does not indicate causation.  Rather, it only suggests that respondents 
at the three ranks perceived the existence of organizational politics differently.  
Graphing the results indicates a linear relationship that supports the hypothesis.  
 H2: Fire agencies with more personnel (both operational and staff), the more 
respondents will perceive organizational politics (POP).  
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This hypothesis was not supported from the Kruskal-Wallis test results. 
 H3: The higher the rank, the more respondents will perceive institutional politics 
(PIP).   
This hypothesis was not supported from the Kruskal-Wallis test results; however, the 
graph for Organizational Level indicates a linear relationship may exist.  That is, as 
that the lower the rank, the more respondents perceived that institutional politics 
exists and runs counter to the hypothesis, which was supported by the literature. 
 H4: The higher the perception of organizational politics (POP), the more respondents 
will perceive the phenomenon affecting one or more management functions.  
The results from the generalized linear regression analysis supported the hypothesis 
for three of the four management activities (strategic planning, budgeting and social 
capital but not for personnel management).   
 H5: The higher the perception of institutional politics (PIP), the more respondents 
will perceive the phenomenon affecting one or more management functions.  
This hypothesis was not supported from generalized linear regression analysis results. 
Discussion of the Findings 
This section provides an in-depth discussion of the findings that help answer the four 
research questions.  In view of that, the following discussion centers on how respondents 
perceived the existence of organizational and institutional politics; how they influence 
management activities; and, what demographic characteristics influence perceptions of 
bureaucratic politics. 
Perceived Existence of Bureaucratic Politics.  The summary data indicates that 
respondents overwhelmingly perceive the existence of both bureaucratic politics variants (POP 
and PIP). Specifically, the mean scores for both variations were well above the mean survey 
scores.  Surprisingly, respondents were considerably more aware of the existence of external 
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politics than they were of internal politics as measured by their respective mean scores (Table 
15). 
       POP PIP 
Survey Scale Average  30 30 
Mean 39.0 55.0 
Table 12: Median scores for POP and PIP survey scale and results. 
 It also appears, based on the results derived from the Kruskal-Wallis tests, there is a 
linear relationship between rank and POP.  Specifically, graphing the Kruskal-Wallis test results 
indicates a negatively linear trajectory of the mean scores for Rank (descending from the 
categories of Fire Officer, Chief Officer to Fire Chief).  To be more precise, the higher the rank, 
the less likely a respondent perceived organizational politics to exist.  This finding is consistent 
with the organizational politics research.  
Influence of Bureaucratic Politics on Management Function.  The second set of 
findings center on how bureaucratic politics influence select management activities - strategic 
planning, budgeting, personnel management, and building social capital.  The mean scores for the 
influence internal and external groups have on several management activities were above the 
survey instrument averages. Specifically, internal groups are perceived to affect strategic 
planning and building social capital while external groups are perceived to affect strategic 
planning, budgeting, and building social capital (Table 16). 
 
Strategic 
Planning 
Internal 
(SPI) 
Social Capital 
Internal 
(SCI) 
Strategic 
Planning 
External 
(SPE) 
Budgeting 
External 
(BE) 
Social Capital 
External 
(SCE) 
Survey Scale 
Average  
6 6 6 6 6 
Median 10.0 11.0 9.0 9.0 10.0 
Table 13: Median scores for perceived influence of internal and external groups on management 
activities survey scale and results. 
While respondents clearly see the existence of POP and PIP as well as acknowledging the 
influence over select management activities, the correlation analysis only yielded one statistically 
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significant negative relationship (between POP and Strategic Planning [SPI]).  This runs contrary 
to the literature, which indicated that politically motivated behavior negatively affects job related 
outcomes such as involvement, commitment, and stress (Vigoda-Gadot, and Drory, 2006).  
Complicating matters, the regression analysis showed statistically significant negative 
linear relationships between POP and strategic planning, budgeting and building social capital.  
That is, as respondents perceived increased levels of organizational politics, there were 
corresponding decreases in their perceptions that the phenomenon influences these three 
management activities.    
Augmenting these findings, regression findings suggest there are negative linear 
relationships between internal influencer groups (Chief Officers, Rank and File personnel, and 
Internal Stakeholders) and the respondents’ perceived existence of organizational politics.   
These two findings were unexpected as the literature indicated the results would be 
contrary to what they were.  There is, however, some evidence to suggest the results were not as 
inconsistent as initially thought. 
Respondents may not perceive these groups as political; rather, they may consider these 
groups advocates for their interests as they represent avenues for direct feedback and input.  This 
comports with the organizational research that suggests that as POP increases, the level of job 
involvement decreases.  Conversely, as job involvement increase, ostensibly, POP should 
decrease as confirmed in these results (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Ferris , Russ, and Fandt, 
1989; Maslyn and Fedor, 1998; Vigoda-Gadot, and Drory, 2006; Witt, 1995; Witt, Patti, and 
Farmer, 2002).   
Conversely, there was only one statistically and one marginally significant (p-value was 
slightly above the selected α = 0.05 at 0.062) positive relationship between institutional politics 
and external influencer groups (PIP and Local Elected Officials and, marginally, Business 
Groups).  This result was supported by the institutional politics literature as both groups are 
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recognized to be overtly political, so it was not surprising to find respondents’ perceived these 
groups as politically oriented and affecting internal activities.  
Influence of Demographics on Perceptions of Bureaucratic Politics.  The last set of 
findings reviewed in this section pertains to how individual and fire department demographic 
data, excluding rank and organizational level, influence respondents’ perceptions of bureaucratic 
politics.  As noted in the previous chapter, demographics seemingly affect POP and marginally do 
so with respect to PIP.  More explicitly, as the population served decreases and level of education 
increases, there is a corresponding decrease in respondents’ perceptions of the existence of 
organizational politics.  Likewise, as the population served increases there is a corresponding 
decrease in respondents’ perceptions of the existence of institutional politics.  These are 
interesting findings as the literature only indirectly supports these relationships.   
 The results of the statistical analysis, while not as definitive or supportive of some of the 
hypotheses as desired, did illuminate some interesting findings. 
 First, there is clearly support for the notion that supervisors at all levels perceive internal 
and external politics to exist. 
 Second, respondents perceived that influencer groups affect specific management 
activities.  What is divergent between internal and external groups is that the former seemingly 
have a positive effect reducing POP, while external groups (specifically politicians and 
potentially business groups) increase the perceptions of institutional politics.    
Finally, there is evidence to suggest demographic characteristics, both individually and 
organizationally, affect perceptions of one or both variants of bureaucratic politics.  One of the 
more fascinating findings is the linear relationships between demographic characteristic and POP 
and PIP.  Explicitly, as education level increases, POP decreases, and as population served 
increases, PIP increases.  These findings have implications for fire service leaders, which is 
discussed in more depth in the following section.   
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Implications 
It was anticipated this study would yield relevant information of particular interest and 
benefit for fire service leaders.  While the results were not as definitive as expected, there were 
findings that have broader implications for both fire service administrators and those in other 
industries.   
Research has consistently demonstrated that individual leaders can positively decrease 
the presence and limit the impact of politics by promoting a culture of inclusivity, transparency, 
and tolerance (Brownrigg-Innes, 2004; Barkdoll , 1992).  For this reason, it is essential managers 
develop and support policies that clearly articulate organizational values, expected culture, and 
desired behavior (Schein, 1993).  Additionally, numerous scholars have observed that negative 
political behavior manifests for a variety of reasons, including but limited to (Burns, 1961; 
DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; DuBrin, 2001 Lowi, 1969; Vigoda, 2003; Vigoda-Gadot and Drory, 
2006) 
1. Insufficient resources available for individuals or groups to accomplish their 
activities that support organizational goals and objectives; 
2. Inconsistent or non-transparent decision-making; 
3. Unpublished or ambiguous organizational vision, mission, goals, and/or 
objectives.   
Leaders must also distinguish between those behaviors and actions that lead to 
negative political perceptions versus those that can be useful and productive (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983; Vigoda-Gadot, and Drory, 2006).  Researchers suggest there are a number of 
actions organizations can take to facilitate a less politically oriented culture:  
1. Honestly evaluate the current climate and culture of the organization. An 
organization's culture consists of shared values, beliefs, and assumptions, which 
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aid in guiding behavior and establishing the organization’s political environment 
(Schein, 1993).   To mitigate a politically toxic organizational culture, leaders 
must assess the cultural changes required to transition the organization, develop 
and implement a strategy, and regularly gauge progress.  The following four 
actions are useful strategies for integrating into the implementation plan.   
 Encourage an open, ethical, and supportive environment as the fear of 
retaliation and ridicule precludes an atmosphere conducive to building trust, 
collaboration and development of shared values.  
 Regularly communicate organizational goals, objectives, and, perhaps most 
importantly, values. Doing so improves employees’ understanding of the 
organization’s values needed to support its overarching vision.  Moreover, 
effective communication allows for easier alignment of workforce efforts 
with an organization’s vision, goals, and objectives.    
 Recognize and reward desired performance and behaviors.   
 Minimize the type of workplace stress that contributes to psychological and 
physiological harm.  
 Reassess the locus of control for allocating resources and decision-making.  
Ferris, Russ, and Fandt (1989) suggested mechanisms that enable more 
control over resources and decision-making contributes to a more positive 
culture.  O’Connor and Morrison (2001) more bluntly assert control is a 
significant predictor of political perceptions.  Enhancing individual or group 
control at lower levels of the organization, then, may be an effective tool for 
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blunting politics’ adverse effects or minimizing the development of negative 
political behavior.   
2. The finding that as population increases, there is a resultant increase in PIP is one of 
the more vexing issues confronting fire service leaders.  The scarcity of literature 
limits practitioners’ understanding how best to address the nexus between these two 
variables.  The literature that has the most relevance is in the realm of public policy 
theory that includes Advocacy Coalition Framework (Sabatier and Hank Jenkins-
Smith, 1993), Deliberative/Participatory Democracy (Dryzek, 2010), Policy Network 
Theory (Klijn, E.H., Koppenjan, J. and Termeer, K. (1995).  Unfortunately, none of 
these theoretic frameworks assesses, nor do they do explicitly address, the internal 
perceptions of institutional politics.  This makes developing adequate strategies for 
dealing with their unfavorable effects when servicing a larger population difficult.  
Thus, it makes future research in this area necessary.  
3. Lastly, the finding that as the level of education increases there is a resultant 
decrease in POP is an important lesson for fire service leaders. Historically, the fire 
service has been perceived to be a predominately blue collar profession (Antonellis, 
2012; Sargent, 2006).  In last several decades, however, this view has shifted as the 
level of training, education, and requisite knowledge, skills and abilities has 
precipitously risen (Fleming, 2010; Smeby, 2013; Smeby and Smeby , 2005; Waite, 
2008).  Despite these gains, there is still internal discussion how much college 
education is necessary to “do the job?”  This is a broader debate outside the scope of 
this paper; nonetheless, the findings from this survey certainly augment a more 
progressive line of thought about the value of education in the fire service.  If these 
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findings are any indication, education may be another elemental key to reducing or 
managing the adverse effects of firefighting.  
Limitations of the Study 
There were several limitations of this study that merit discussion: 
1. While this research randomized for the selection of the sample population, the lack 
of direct access to the fire supervisor population may have hindered a more robust 
response rate.  It is plausible that having had a narrower focus (e.g., using 
departments in a confined region or state or sending the survey directly to 
supervisors within an agency the researcher had direct access to) would have 
produced more conclusive results. 
2. Because this study was limited to a sample population of U.S. fire service 
supervisors the results should not be generalized to any other public or private 
sector groups. 
3. The researcher’s commitment, as outlined in the IRB, to maintain respondent 
anonymity precluded tracking of individual respondents.  This limited the 
researcher’s ability to assess possible biases or follow up with reminders to those 
who had not taken the survey to help ensure higher response rates. 
4. As noted in the Literature Review chapter, the concept of institutional politics has 
not sufficiently evolved as a theoretic paradigm to allow for measuring its 
perceived existence, much less impact.  This has forced the few researchers who 
have attempted to study individual perceptions of the phenomenon to develop 
instruments that have not been rigorously validated. Thus, the instrument used for 
this survey was constructed using criteria the literature indicated would be 
necessary for accurate measurement.  Unfortunately, the results from this survey 
did not substantiate this assessment and, the instrument constructed, used criteria 
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narrowly tailored to the industry.  Future researchers would be well advised to 
adapt this survey to be more generalized and apply it to a broader set of industries, 
which could assess its validity for measuring PIP.    
5. While the operationalization of management activities allowed for some unique 
findings suggesting causal relationships between those activities and POP, the low 
response rate does not allow for more generalizable conclusions to be made.     
Recommendations for Future Research 
Several recommendations from this study will prove instructive for future inquiries into 
the phenomenon of bureaucratic politics, particularly within the fire service.  Specific 
recommendations are as follows: 
1. There may be a need to utilize an expanded and more refined survey instrument 
tailored to the unique organizational attributes of the fire service.  If a researcher 
studies this population, he or she should take into consideration inclusion of 
additional information or revise the survey instrument to include:  
a. Questions to help a researcher gauge respondents’ perceptions of how 
politically active specific stakeholder groups are – i.e., do they view their 
respective unions low or highly politically active.   
b. Include additional demographic information: 
 More respondent demographic information such as age, ethnicity, sex, 
years in service, etc. 
 More demographic information of respondents’ agencies. 
 Hiring practices to include use of civil service boards or processes. 
 The participant's relationship with the union, if applicable (e.g., former 
union president, member, etc.) or specific political activity (e.g., 
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engaging in collective bargaining negotiations, assisting with election 
activities for local or state officials or for ballot initiatives).  
 The hiring/firing process for the fire chief (e.g., city or county managers, 
political appointment, civil service, etc.).  
c. Refine the PIP construct so it assesses politics across other industries. 
d. Refine the management construct to include other activities. 
2. Consider alternate survey sampling techniques.  Since there is no accessible database 
listing all fire supervisors it required sending the engagement emails to fire chiefs 
who acted as gatekeepers.  Their ability to withhold distribution of the email and link 
to the survey may have hindered a more robust response rate.  Initially the researcher 
had considered utilizing recognized trade organizations to assist disseminating a 
request to participate in the survey.  Concerns over invalidating the randomized 
nature of the sample population out-weighed the concerns for low response rates.  In 
retrospect, a follow-on research project would be instructive for validating the results 
of this project as well as Phillips’ (2004) findings. 
3. A qualitative follow on study would contribute greater clarity and context to the 
quantitative studies done to date. More precisely, at the heart of qualitative research 
is its ability to uncover socially relevant meanings to the events, actions or 
interactions of life (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000).  These inquires may inform future 
quantitative researchers to allow refinement of the survey instrument to reflect 
information gleaned from the qualitative findings. 
4. Integrate more network analysis in future research.  As noted in the Literature 
Review, scholars are only recently documenting the importance of an organization’s 
ability to harness or build social capital.  The ability to secure both tangible and 
intangible resources empowers members by using their social networks in manner 
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that benefits the organization (Portes, 1998; Wilson, 1997).  It is evident that political 
obstacles undermine an organization's ability to build invaluable social capital.  
Failure to recognize this connection can lead to underutilization or misallocation of 
human capital (Wilson, 1997).  Organizational leaders must, then, enhance the five 
distinct skill sets required to build social capital: communications, relationship 
building, group development, networking, and leadership skills (Wilson, 1997).  This 
realization provides strong incentive to integrate the concept into future research.  
While there are other recommendations that could be made for improving on this 
research, they are largely stylistic or minor in nature.  The ones noted above, by contrast, are 
substantive as they would improve the quality and generalizability of the findings. 
Conclusion 
There is an old adage in the fire service that defines the profession as “200 years of 
tradition unimpeded by progress” (Nollette, Foster Nollette, and Goertzen , 2012, p. 131).  No 
one can say where it originated, but its constant usage paints an uncomplimentary portrait of a 
profession that cannot, or will not, easily change with the times. While this seems overly 
simplistic and marginalizes the profession’s actual progress, it does leave one to wonder if, in 
some small way, it has merit. If true, the more relevant question is what is the underlying reason 
for the persistence of such a fatalistic sense of stagnation?  One answer might be the existence 
and impact of internal and external politics that afflicts the profession, and, more specifically, fire 
service supervisors. These political forces are more precisely termed bureaucratic politics. 
Certainly, understanding how bureaucratic politics affects fire service executives is as 
important as it is in other industries (Dawson, 1980; Grant and Hoover, 1994).  Accordingly, this 
paper advanced four research questions designed to allow for an increased understanding of the 
relationship between perceptions of bureaucratic politics and fire service supervisors’ opinions 
that they hinder management functions.  
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In this era of hyper-politics, it is more than an academic exercise to examine how 
bureaucratic politics affect policy formulation and implementation.  As such, this research project 
represents the first step in examining this phenomenon in an industry political scientists have 
largely ignored.  If bureaucratic politics do exist within the fire service as the findings suggest, 
the information gleaned from this research will help scholars and practitioners develop specific 
strategies to deal with them.  In so doing, fire service leaders can minimize their negative 
influence and enable them to more effectively carrying out their agency’s mission.  Perhaps, then, 
with this enhanced insight the tiresome adage used to define today's fire service will one day be 
nothing more than a relic of the past.
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APPENDIX 
 
 
 
 
 
Survey Instrument 
 
 
Measuring fire officers' 
perceptions of politics 
and their impact on 
managing 
 
 
 
Introduction: 
 
Your department was randomly chosen to participate in this survey from 1,708 career 
departments registered with the United States Fire Administration (USFA) Census. 
 
The purpose of the survey is to gather data that will help measure the extent to which 
career fire service supervisors, nationally, perceive the existence of internal and external 
politics. It will also examine the extent to which supervisors perceive these influences to 
affect specific management activities. 
 
Politics, as used in this survey, are those activities engaged in by individuals or groups 
that are intended to protect or promote their special interests. These individuals or 
groups can be inside or outside the department. 
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The survey is broken into three sections: 
 
• Section I: Perceptions and Impact of Politics 
• Section II: Demographic Information 
• Section III: Survey Instrument Feedback 
 
The primary benefit of this study is that the findings will give future researchers and 
practitioners deeper insight into the relationship between internal and external politics 
and fire service supervisors. In turn, this knowledge will allow fire service leaders to 
develop the necessary skills to successfully manage these frequently counterproductive 
forces. 
 
Procedure: Proceeding with this survey implies your consent to participate and that you 
are affirming that you are a line or staff supervisor within your department holding the 
rank, or its equivalent, of lieutenant or higher. 
 
Participation is voluntary and if at any point you would like to stop, you may do so at 
any time. 
There are no incorrect responses, and answering the questions requires no special 
knowledge. 
Time Commitment: This survey will take you approximately 25 -35 minutes to complete. 
 
Survey Dates: The survey will be available from February 21 - March 31, 2014. 
Contacts: If you have any questions, please contact me or my Student Advisor using the 
following contact information: 
 
Steven E. Standridge (Principal 
Researcher)  
E-mail: steve.standridge@okstate.edu  
Phone: 303-210-8987 
9195 E. Mineral Ave.  
Centennial, CO. 80112 
 
Dr. Anthony (Tony) Brown, Ph.D., MPA  
Associate Professor and Coordinator  
Email: anthony.brown@okstate.edu  
Phone: (405)744-0420 
Department of Political Science  
228 Murray Hall 
Oklahoma State University 
Stillwater, OK 74078 USA 
 
If you have any additional questions about your rights as a research volunteer, you may 
also contact Dr. Shelia Kennison, IRB Chair, 116 North Murray Hall, Department of 
Psychology, Stillwater, OK 74078, 405-744-3377 or shelia.kennison@okstate.edu.  
Thank-you in advance for your time and consideration. 
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Q1. In order to proceed with the survey you must be employed with a career fire 
department as a line or staff supervisor within your department holding the rank, or its 
equivalent, of lieutenant or higher. Please note, if you hold a staff position that does not 
have a denoted rank but it is considered a supervisory position comparable to those in 
ranked positions with respect to pay and/or position within the department (e.g., 
Human Resources Director, Fleet Manager, etc.) you meet the criteria to proceed with 
the survey.  
Please indicate if you meet the criteria.  
□ Yes 
□ No 
 
Q2. In order to proceed with the survey, please confirm that you have read and agree to 
the terms of the consent form: 
 Confidentiality – No information will be collected that will identify the survey 
taker, therefore they will remain anonymous throughout the process.  
 Data Security – the following measures will be used to ensure confidentiality of 
the data obtained from the surveys:  
o Data Storage – all survey data will be stored in two password encrypted 
protected hard drives on the principal researcher's personal computer 
located at his home residence. 
o This computer and the associated hard drives are only accessible to the 
principal researcher and no one else.  
o This data will be kept for five years after publication. If no inquiries are 
made requesting specific information about the data it will be deleted 
from the hard drives.  
o The data will be reported as part of the principal researcher's dissertation 
requirements and an academic journal as an article.  
 There are no foreseeable risks to maintaining confidentiality as the completed 
surveys and all related data will only be accessible to the research author and 
reported as a summary in the final dissertation paper. The records from this 
study will be kept private. 
 There are no other known risks associated with this project which are greater 
than those ordinarily encountered in daily life.  
 
□ Yes: I have read and fully understand the information contained in the 
introduction and consent pages. I proceed with the following survey freely and 
voluntarily. 
□ No: I have not read and/or do not fully understand the consent information 
provided. 
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Section I 
Perceptions and Impact of Politics 
This section measures the extent to which you perceive the existence of internal and 
external politics.   It also measures your perceptions politics have on your ability to 
manage your day-to-day responsibilities, make managerial decisions, or institute 
change. Check the answer that most applies for your organization. 
 
Q3. The following questions measure the extent to which you perceive the existence of 
internal politics. Check the answer that most applies for your organization 
Question 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Undecided
/Neutral 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
People in my department attempt to 
build themselves up by tearing 
others down 
1 2 3 4 5 
There has always been an influential 
group in my department that no one 
ever crosses 
1 2 3 4 5 
Employees are encouraged to speak 
out frankly even when they are 
critical of well-established ideas 
1 2 3 4 5 
There is no place for yes-men around 
here; good ideas are desired even if it 
means disagreeing with supervisors 
1 2 3 4 5 
Agreeing with powerful others is the 
best alternative in this organization 
1 2 3 4 5 
It is best not to rock the boat in my 
department 
1 2 3 4 5 
Sometimes it is easier to remain 
quiet than fight the system 
1 2 3 4 5 
Telling others what they want to 
hear is sometimes better than telling 
the truth 
1 2 3 4 5 
It is safer to think what you are told 
than make up your own mind 
1 2 3 4 5 
Since I have worked in my 
department, I have never seen the 
pay and promotion policies applied 
politically 
1 2 3 4 5 
I can’t remember when a person 
received a pay increase or promotion 
that was inconsistent with the 
1 2 3 4 5 
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published policies 
Question 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Undecided
/Neutral 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
None of the raises I have received 
are consistent with how raises 
should be determined 
1 2 3 4 5 
The stated pay and promotion 
policies have nothing to do with how 
pay raises and promotions are 
determined 
1 2 3 4 5 
When it comes to pay raise and 
promotion decisions, policies are 
irrelevant 
1 2 3 4 5 
Promotions around here are not 
valued much because how they are 
determined is so political 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Q4. The following questions measure the extent to which you perceive the existence of 
external politics. Check the answer that most applies for your organization. 
Question 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Undecided
/Neutral 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
My department pays attention to or 
adopts the practices of other fire 
departments considered “leaders” in 
the industry 
1 2 3 4 5 
My department pays attention to or 
adopts the “best practices” of non-
fire organizations (e.g., educational 
requirements, financial and hiring 
practices, information technology 
standards) 
1 2 3 4 5 
My department adopts the 
recommendations of fire service 
associations/organizations the 
department belongs to (e.g., 
National Fire Protection Association 
[NFPA], Fire Department Safety 
Officers Association, U.S. Fire 
Administration, International Society 
of Fire Service Instructors, 
International Association of Fire 
Chiefs [IAFC]) 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Question 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Undecided
/Neutral 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
My fire department adopts policies 
similar to those of other regional or 
local mutual aid fire departments 
1 2 3 4 5 
My department adopted national 
response time benchmarks to be 
uniform with other regional or local 
mutual aid fire departments 
1 2 3 4 5 
My department is subject to periodic 
review by an outside licensing 
organization (e.g., state or federal 
health departments, motor vehicle 
agencies, Environmental Protection 
Agency [EPA], Federal 
Communication Commission [FCC]) 
1 2 3 4 5 
My department is regulated very 
much or almost completely by 
government agencies (Civil Service 
Commissions/Boards, Employee 
Equal Opportunity Commission 
[EEOC], State Fire Marshal) 
1 2 3 4 5 
My department adopted the 
National Incident Management 
System (NIMS) as our formal incident 
management system to become 
eligible for federal or state grant 
funds 
1 2 3 4 5 
My fire department adopted policies 
to avoid litigation or meet state or 
federal requirements 
1 2 3 4 5 
My department adopted national 
response time benchmarks to avoid 
litigation or meet state or federal 
requirements 
1 2 3 4 5 
Members of my department who 
have at least a four-year degree 
(bachelor’s, master’s, doctorate, or 
law) are influential change agents 
within the department 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Question 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Undecided
/Neutral 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Members of my department who 
have received industry specific 
professional credentials (Center for 
Public Safety Excellence’s [CPSE] 
Chief Fire Officer [CFO], National Fire 
Academy’s Executive Fire Officer’s 
[EFO] designations) are influential 
change agents within the 
department 
1 2 3 4 5 
Members of my department who are 
active in regional, state, or national 
groups (e.g., Urban Area Security 
Initiative [UASI], training officer, 
technical rescue, hazmat groups) are 
influential change agents within the 
department 
1 2 3 4 5 
My fire department adopted policies 
to conform to meet NFPA standards, 
address recommendations made by 
an outside consultant/study, or 
improve an accreditation criterion 
1 2 3 4 5 
My department adopted response 
time benchmarks to meet NFPA 
standards, address 
recommendations made by an 
outside consultant/study, or improve 
an accreditation criterion 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Q5. Please indicate the impact each of these groups has on strategic planning: 
 
No 
Impact 
Slight 
Impact 
Moderate 
Impact 
Much 
Impact 
Extreme 
Impact 
Local elected officials  1 2 3 4 5 
Union or collective bargaining unit 1 2 3 4 5 
Local business groups or 
organizations (e.g., homeowners, 
chamber of commerce, realtor, 
builder associations, etc.) 
1 2 3 4 5 
Chief Officers (Battalion Chief or 
higher) 
1 2 3 4 5 
Rank and File Operational 
Personnel (Captain or lower) 
1 2 3 4 5 
Other Internal stakeholder groups 
excluding groups listed in a-e 
(support or non-uniformed staff 
personnel, committees, special 
workgroups, etc.)  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Q6. Please indicate the impact each of these groups has on budget development: 
 
No 
Impact 
Slight 
Impact 
Moderate 
Impact 
Much 
Impact 
Extreme 
Impact 
Local elected officials  1 2 3 4 5 
Union or collective bargaining unit 1 2 3 4 5 
Local business groups or 
organizations (e.g., homeowners, 
chamber of commerce, realtor, 
builder associations, etc.) 
1 2 3 4 5 
Chief Officers (Battalion Chief or 
higher) 
1 2 3 4 5 
Rank and File Operational 
Personnel (Captain or lower) 
1 2 3 4 5 
Other Internal stakeholder groups 
excluding groups listed in a-e 
(support or non-uniformed staff 
personnel, committees, special 
workgroups, etc.)  
1 2 3 4 5 
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Q7. Please indicate the impact each of these groups has on personnel actions (e.g., 
hiring, promotions, demotions, firings): 
 
No 
Impact 
Slight 
Impact 
Moderate 
Impact 
Much 
Impact 
Extreme 
Impact 
Local elected officials  1 2 3 4 5 
Union or collective bargaining unit 1 2 3 4 5 
Local business groups or 
organizations (e.g., homeowners, 
chamber of commerce, realtor, 
builder associations, etc.) 
1 2 3 4 5 
Chief Officers (Battalion Chief or 
higher) 
1 2 3 4 5 
Rank and File Operational 
Personnel (Captain or lower) 
1 2 3 4 5 
Other Internal stakeholder groups 
excluding groups listed in a-e 
(support or non-uniformed staff 
personnel, committees, special 
workgroups, etc.)  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Q8. Please indicate the impact each of these groups has on communicating positive or 
negative images of your department: 
 No 
Impact 
Slight 
Impact 
Moderate 
Impact 
Much 
Impact 
Extreme 
Impact 
Local elected officials  1 2 3 4 5 
Union or collective bargaining unit 1 2 3 4 5 
Local business groups or 
organizations (e.g., homeowners, 
chamber of commerce, realtor, 
builder associations, etc.) 
1 2 3 4 5 
Chief Officers (Battalion Chief or 
higher) 
1 2 3 4 5 
Rank and File Operational 
Personnel (Captain or lower) 
1 2 3 4 5 
Other Internal stakeholder groups 
excluding groups listed in a-e 
(support or non-uniformed staff 
personnel, committees, special 
workgroups, etc.)  
1 2 3 4 5 
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Section II 
Demographic Information 
This section captures the demographic characteristics of your department. Check the 
answer that most applies for your organization. 
 
Q9. How is your fire department governed (check the one that most applies)? 
_____  City Department 
_____  County Department 
_____  Special District 
_____  Other: Specify _______________________________ 
 
Q10. How many full time employees (front line operational and staff) does your 
department employ?  
_____  Fewer than 50 
_____  50 - 99 
_____  More than 99 
 
Q11. What is the population density your fire department serves? 
_____  450,000 or more 
_____  300,000 – 449,999 
_____  150,000 – 299,999 
_____  50,000 – 149,999 
_____  Less than 50,000 
 
Q12. What is your rank? 
_____ Fire Chief  
_____ Deputy Chief  
_____ Assistant Chief  
_____ Division Chief 
_____ District Chief 
_____ Bureau Chief 
_____ Battalion Chief 
_____ Captain 
_____ Lieutenant 
_____ Other: Specify _______________________________ 
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Q13.  At what level of the organization is your rank? 
_____ Top Level (Fire Chief)  
_____ One Level Down from Fire Chief  
_____ Two Levels Down from Fire Chief  
_____ Three Levels Down from Fire Chief 
_____ Four Levels Down from Fire Chief 
_____ Five Levels Down from Fire Chief 
_____ Six or More Levels Down from Fire Chief 
 
Q14.  What is your highest level of education? 
_____  High School (8th -12th Grades) 
_____  Some College or an Associate’s Degree 
_____  Undergraduate Degree 
_____  Graduate Degree (Masters, PhD, JD) 
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Section III 
Survey Instrument Feedback 
This section is designed to solicit your feedback for improving the survey you just took in 
order for final distribution to the larger sample population. Please be honest in your 
assessment of the instrument. Your feedback is the only means I have for improving its 
clarity and utility. 
 
Q15. Was the purpose of the survey clear to you? 
□ Yes 
□ No 
why?________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Q16. Was this subject of interest to you? 
□ Yes 
□ No 
why?________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Q17. Was the length of the survey for the topic: 
□ Too short                        
□ Just right 
□ Too long 
why?________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Q18. Were the questions in Section I understandable? 
□ Yes 
□ No 
If no, please specify which question(s) and 
why?________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Q19. Were the questions in Section II understandable? 
□ Yes 
□ No 
If no, please specify which question(s) and 
why?________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Q20.  Additional Comments:   
 _____________________________________________________________________ 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
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